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ARTICLE
DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL:
TERRORISM, CRIME, AND NATIONAL
SECURITY POLICY IN A POST 9-11
WORLD
DAVID SCHULTZ*

INTRODUCTION

The events of 9-11 presented western democracies with a challenge
and a test. 1 The challenge: respond to terrorism either by military or
diplomatic means (such as criminal apprehension and prosecution) to
address national security needs and to protect civilian populations,
infrastructure, and commerce. The test: meet the terrorist and national
* Professor, Graduate School of Management, Department of Criminal Justice and
Forensic Science, HamJine University, and University of Minnesota Law School. This article was
originally presented as a paper at the Oxford Round Table conference on criminal law, March 26 31, 2006, Oxford University, England, and the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association, August 30th-September 2nd, 2007. I am indebted to all the participants for
their excellent suggestions and comments. Special acknowledgments go to Ralph Ruebner at the
John Marshall Law School and David Rudstein of Chicago-Kent College of Law for their insights
and ideas.
1 The "events of 9-11" in this Article shall refer to the instances of terrorism taking place
in the United States on September II, 200 I: the hijacking of several airplanes by al-Qaeda terrorists
and their subsequent crashing into the World Trade Center towers in New York City, the Pentagon
building in Washington, D.C., and the downing of another passenger plane in Pennsylvania, which
was putatively destined for the White House or Capitol.
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security challenges while simultaneously respecting international law,
human rights, domestic constitutionalism, rule of law, and individual
rights and liberties of both citizens and non-citizens. 2 Unfortunately, the
report card on both the challenge and test reveal a mixed record,
especially in the United States.
Following the events of 9-11, the United States has not experienced
another domestic act of terrorism-leading President Bush to claim that
the country was winning the war against terrorism. 3 But both the United
Kingdom and Spain were victims of terrorism,4 Australia claimed
knowledge of an imminent attack,5 and Canada arrested several
individuals plotting to bomb sites across its nation. 6 As a result of the
events of 9-11, some, such as John C. Yoo, former White House
Counsel and now Berkeley law professor, have declared that the West
faces a new war, demanding new security measures that perhaps
challenge pre-9-11 notions of presidential power and civil liberties. 7 The
result has been various measures such as the Patriot Act, detention of
civilians and noncivilians suspected as terrorists, reinterpretations of
international law or conventions (including the International Convention
Against Torture and the Geneva Accords), and the use of wiretaps by the
National Security Agency in the United States. Parallel efforts, both in
the United Kingdom and Australia, to increase the surveillance,
detention, and prosecution of suspected terrorists, have also been
attempted. 8

2 See, e.g., DAVID DVZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF
EMERGENCY 1-2, 17-18 (2006) [hereinafter DVZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAWI which makes
a similar point.
3 See, e.g., The White House, "Waging and Winning the War on Terror" (available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocuslachievementlchapl.html) (last visited May 13, 2008)
(describing how the United States was winning the war on terrorism).
4 See London rocked by terror attacks, BBC NEWS, July 7, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uklllhilukl4659093.stm; Scores die in Madrid bomb carnage, BBC NEWS, Mar.
11, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.ukl2/hi1europe/3500452.stm.
5 Raymond Bonner, Australia to Present Strict Antiterrorism Statute, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 3,
2005 at A6 (reporting that Prime Minister John Howard had warned of a potential terrorist attack
based upon unspecified police and intelligence information).
6 Ian Austen & David Johnston, 17 Held in Plot to Bomb Sites Across Ontario, N.Y.
TIMES, June 4,2006 at AI.
7 JOHN C. Yoo, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 ix-x (2005) [hereinafter Yoo, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE]. See also
MIRKO BAGARIC & JULIE CLARKE, TORTURE: WHEN THE UNTHINKABLE IS MORALLY PERMISSmLE
4 (2007) (arguing that torture is a legitimate tool to protect the innocent as a result of the events of 911 and the rise of worldwide terrorism).
8 DVZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW at 16 (discussing efforts to use indefinite
detention against aliens suspected of being terrorists, and Tony Blair's proposal for the detaining of
suspects without charges for up to 90 days.
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Overall, post 9-11 concerns regarding terrorism in the United States,
among the members of the European Union ("EU"), and in other western
democracies have led to the convergence of the traditionally distinct
policy areas of domestic criminal justice and national security. This
convergence has produced several policy and institutional conflicts that
pit individual rights against homeland security, domestic law and
institutions against international norms and tribunals, and criminal justice
agencies against national security organizations. As David Dyzenhaus
aptly describes it, situations such as the West faces in a post 9-11
environment challenge claims about the viability or the rule of law and
traditional notions of constitutionalism during emergencies. 9
This Article examines regime responses to international terrorism,
principally in the United States, in comparison to the European Union,
and describes the consequences of the merger of criminal justice norms
with national security imperatives.1O The collapse of criminal justice into
national security norms has manifested numerous contradictions that
pose perhaps even more significant challenges to Western European and
North American style democracies than does international terrorism.
Specifically, the collapse of the criminal justice norms into national
security has both threatened civil liberties and augmented claims (at least
in the United States) of extra-constitutional powers for the president.
Moreover, while the courts have generally placed some limits on these
trends, it is not so clear that abuses of individual rights or executive
power can be reconciled with substantive notions of rule of law and
constitutionalism.
Part I of this Article establishes the basic values and norms that
frame western-style democracies, such as the United States and the states
of the ED. Part IT examines the development of the war on terrorism in
the United States, concentrating on actions taken by the Bush
Administration in response to 9-11, its justification for expansion of
presidential authority, and the impact both have had upon individual
liberties. Part ill assesses the Bush Administration's legal arguments for
the war on terrorism and the expansion of presidential power, by
discussing how the courts have responded to the government's efforts to
curtail individual liberties. Part IV briefly switches to the impact of the

1d. at 17,34.
10 While not the focus of this Article, on November 3, 2005, Australia amended its
antiterrorism law. See Anti-Terrorism Act 2005 (Aust!.), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/
ComLa w/LegislationlAct l.nsf/0/36EFCECD88B7EF2BCA2570B2000C3E91 /$file/127 -2005.pdf.
This Act made it easier to prosecute an individual under existing law by dropping the requirement
that a particular act was terrorist in nature. Instead, one would merely need to show how the act was
"related" to terrorism.
9
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war on terrorism in England and the EU, seeking to provide a contrast to
approaches found in the United States.
While recognizing that 9-11 was a tragedy, the response to these
events has been even more tragic, especially in light of threats to
individual and civil rights, international law, and democratic processes in
general. The convergence of national security or intelligence gathering
with criminal justice, in the name of homeland security and the war on
terror, has resulted in a war on civil liberties that has undermined
responses to terrorism and threatened democracy and individual rights.
I. DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM

Western European and North American style democracies are
indebted to a confluence of three political traditions that inform the way
their institutions operate. These traditions are democracy, liberalism, and
constitutionalism.
The concept of "democracy" is very old, dating back to Plato and
the ancient Greeks who saw it as a rule by the masses. l1 More modern
notions of democracy labeled it a form of popular government where the
people rule, either directly or indirectly through their representatives,
based upon the principle of majority rule. "Liberalism," a concept whose
origins are often traced to John Locke,12 represents a set of political
values committed to the protection of individual rights, to polities
instituted on the basis of the consent of the governed, and to a notion of a
limited government. 13 Third, "constitutionalism" as a concept is also
very old, again dating back to the ancient Greeks,14 especially Aristotle,
and it refers to the basic structures, "grundnorm," or rules that constitute
a government. 15 As the term has evolved in Western Europe and North
America, constitutionalism refers to a government of limited powers,
which often must adhere to rule of law, procedural due process or
regularity, and a commitment to the protection of individual rights. 16

J. ROLAND PENNOCK, DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL THEORY 1-5 (1979).
12 See generally JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT (peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge U. Press 1967).
I3 See generally J. ROLAND PENNOCK & JOHN W. CHAPMAN, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (NYU
Press 1983). See also GUIDO DE RUGGIERO, THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN LIBERALISM 1-8 (Beacon
Press 1959) (describing the differences between democracy and liberalism).
"CHARLES HOWARD McILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 1-3 (rev.
ed. 1958).
15 See generally HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF THE LAW AND STATE (Russell &
Russell 1961) (describing a "grundnorm" as the constitution or theory of rules for a state.)
16 JAMES T. McHUGH, COMPARATNE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITIONS 5-10 (2002).
II
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l7

However, as both Lon Fuller and David Dyzenhaus l8 have argued,
adherence to rule of law is more than a formal set of rules. For Fuller,
there are eight requisites to giving the law an inner morality that
constrains arbitrary actions. 19 Similarly, Dyzenhaus asserts that the inner
morality of law as described by Fuller is more than a procedural
adherence to rule of law?O Instead, rule of law imposes a substantive
limit on the government. Hence, he rejects the idea that there needs to be
special constitutional rules or powers during emergencies?1
Together, democratic, liberal, and constitutional values are
important values in the United States, the United Kingdom, and many, if
not all, of the European Union member states. 22 Even if the exact
application of the three values varies across these countries,23
commitments to majority rule balanced by minority rights, procedural
regularity, and a government subject to some limits, are shared by many
countries in the west claiming to be democracies.
A. UNITED STATES

The United States of America generally shares in having
democratic, liberal, and constitutional values that inform its political
traditions. As conceived in 1787, its Constitution is more specifically
indebted to a set of political values found in the liberal, republican, and
legal traditions indebted to John Locke, James Harrington, and William
Blackstone. 24 The original logic for American government is often
referred to as Madisonian democracy, a reference to James Madison, one
of the primary authors of the Constitution. 25 He is also one of the authors
fuLLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 245-53 (Yale University Press 1975).
DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW 10,61 (2006).
19 fuLLER, THE MORALITY OF LA W at 33-38.
20 DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LA W at 10.
21 [d. at 59-62.
17 LoN
18

22 Compare c.B. MACPHERSON, DEMOCRATIC THEORY: ESSAYS IN RETRIEVAL (1973)
(noting the tensions and strains among varieties or variations of democratic theories and liberal
theory).
23 See G. BINGHAM POWELL, JR., ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY 2046
(2000) (discussing the differences in how constitutional designs in majoritarian and proportional
systems affect political accountability).
24 See generally David Schultz, Political Theory and Legal History: Conflicting Depictions
of Property in the American Political Founding, 37 A J. LEGAL. HIST. 464 (1993); LoUIS HARTZ,
THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT
SINCE THE REVOLUTION (Harcourt Brace Jovanich 1955); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN
MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLIC TRADITION (Princeton
University Press, 1975).
25 ROBERT DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY: How DOES POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY FUNCTION IN AMERICA? 4-34 (University of Chicago Press 1956) (describing the
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of the Federalist Papers, which are often described as an authoritative
gloss on the intent of the constitutional framers.
Madisonian democracy is depicted as a government set up to
prevent tyrannies of the majority.26 As described in The Federalist No.
JO, majority factions pose a threat to the public good or the rights of
others in traditional republics. 27 To control this threat, Madison
described the need to create a political system that was socially
heterogeneous and geographically large, so as to make it more difficult
for factions to compete. 28 But he also proposed a system of legislative
supremacy, separation of powers, checks and balances, bicameralism,
and federalism as ways to break open concentrations of power and thwart
the ability of majority factions to form. 29 In addition, factions would be
encouraged to compete, thereby also reducing the potency and likelihood
. . 30
of anyone f rom d ommatmg.
In addition to this design, James Madison subsequently proposed a
Bill of Rights to offer additional protections for individual rights. These,
along with other amendments to the Constitution, provide further
protection for individuals or minorities against majority rule. Moreover,
as a result of fears of communism and the rise of fascism during the
middle of the twentieth century, some have argued that Madisonian
democracy in the United States evolved into a pluralist democracy?1 A
pluralist democracy is one based upon group competition for political
power while traditional Madisonian democracy envisions individual
competition.32 Whatever variant of democracy, the American
Constitution is one that confers political power. 33 It provides that, absent
explicit or implied constitutional clauses conferring power upon the three
branches of the federal government, there is no extra constitutional
power to act.

facets or features of Madisonian democracy).
26 [d.

27 THE

28

FEDERALIST No.

10, at 59-61 (James Madison) (Edward M. Earle ed. 1937).

[d.

29 See also LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(1990) for a similar analysis and description of American constitutionalism, especially as it applies
to foreign affairs.
30 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 at 335, 337(James Madison) (Edward M. Earle ed., 1937).

31

OPINION,

DAVID B.TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC

6-7,520 (2d ed. 1971).
32

[d.

33 McCulloch
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B. UNITED KINGDOM

Bernard Bailyn has argued that growing disagreement over what
representation, constitutionalism, and sovereignty meant were at the core
of the disputes between America and Great Britain, precipitating the
American Revolution. 34 Bailyn's comments point to some of the
differences between these governments that would eventually
characterize the respective countries. 35
While the American political tradition emphasizes the importance of
a written constitution serving as a limit upon the government, in the
United Kingdom that is not the case. 36 There is no real written
constitution. Instead there is a series of practices, legislative enactments,
and documents, such as the Magna Carta, the English Bill of Rights, and
the Petition of Right, that form the British Constitution. In addition, the
concept of legislative or parliamentary sovereignty seems to make
Parliament equal to what is constitutional. 37 The constitution, then, is not
something that necessarily limits Parliament since the two are not seen as
distinct,38 as is the government and the Constitution in the United States.
A second critical difference between the United States and the
United Kingdom regards the concept of separation of powers. Even
though the separation of judicial, executive, and legislative powers into
the three branches of the American government was augmented by
checks and balances and some sharing of powers, parliamentary systems
of government, such as in the United Kingdom, are characterized by
even less formal notions of separation of powers than in the United
States. 39 For example, while the crown is often considered the
government, the prime minister and his cabinet are both members of
Parliament and the government. Similarly, courts are also considered
part of the government, arising out of the crown. 40
While individual rights can be altered by Parliament, respect for
them is an important part of the British legal tradition, as is a

34

BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

(Belknap Press 1967).
351d. at 1-9.
36 D.C.M. YARDLEY, INTRODUCTION TO BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1-6 (1984);
T.R.S. ALLAN, LAW, LffiERTY, AND JUSTICE: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH
CONSTITUTIONALISM, 4-5 (1994).
YARDLEY, INTRODUCTION TO BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 31-43.
1d.
391d. at 75-80; ALLAN, LAW, LIBERTY, AND JUSTICE: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF
BRITISH CONSTITUTIONALISM at 183-211.
40 YARDLEY, INTRODUCTION TO BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 75-80.
37

38
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commitment to a rule of law.41 Finally, while prior to the ascension of
William and Mary in the seventeenth century the crown was considered
to have certain inherent royal prerogatives, they now exist only at the
pleasure of Parliament. 42
Overall, despite important differences from the United States, the
British Constitution, like its American counterpart, also seems committed
to limited government, respect for individual rights, and rule of law as a
method of enforcing procedural regularity.
C. EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS

The various treaties and agreements that have produced the
European Union have developed a series of political institutions for the
facilitation of open markets across its member states. Several agreements
support what is often described as the three pillars of EU. The fIrst pillar
is the creation of the European Community (EC), built from the 1951
European Steel and Coal Community, the 1955 European Atomic Energy
Community, and finally, in 1993, the Treaty on European Union
("TEU") of Maastricht. 43 This treaty, as amended by the 1997 Treaty of
Amsterdam ("TOA"), created the basic structure of the EC. 44 Together,
the TEU and the TOA forged the second pillar, the Common Foreign and
Security Policy ("CFSP"), and the third pillar, Justice and Home
45
Affairs. These three pillars constitute the heart of the EU.
The European Commission approximates an executive branch of
career civil servants and is headed by twenty-seven Commissioners,
including the Commission President, who oversee the bureaucracy,
which is organized into numerous Directorates General. 46 The Council
of the European Union consists of more political members and has a
representative from each member state, along with a president who holds
office for six months, with the office rotating among all the member
states. 47 The European Council consists of a head of state or government
from each of the member states, and the members of the European
Parliament are allocated among the different member states. In addition

411d.
42 1d. at 53-58.
43

PAUL CRAIG AND GRAINNE DE BUReA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASE, AND MATERIALS 24

(Oxford University Press 1998).
44 Id. at 32-33.
45 1d.
1d. at 50-56.
47 1d. at 57-58.

46
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to there being a variety of special EU boards or institutions, there is the
Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice ("ECJ"). The
ECJ is available to adjudicate legal disputes between member states and
commumties, disputes over EU treaty interpretation, and
employee/employer disputes, among other issues. 48
The governance and structure of the EU has been criticized as
suffering from a "democratic deficit.,,49 In addition, when the original
European Community ("EC") treaties were signed in the 1950's, they
contained no express provisions for the protection of human rights. 50 The
ECJ has ruled that the EC could not accede to the European Convention
of Human Rights ("ECHR,,).51 However, the Court of Justice has used
its power to create a series of fundamental rights 52 which it has used on
occasion to annul community laws. 53 Among the rights created or
recognized by the ECJ are the protection of property rights,54 legal
certainty, 55 a right to a hearing, 56 and equal treatment for men and
women. 57 The origin of these rights is found in the "constitutional
traditions common to the Member States.,,58
Far more important than ECJ construction of fundamental rights, the
ECHR provides for protection of individual rights in Europe since all
member states of the EU are also parties to it. 59 Among its major
provisions are a ban on torture and inhuman treatment,60 a right to liberty

Id. at 79-81.
See STUN SMISMANS, LAW, LEGITIMACY, AND EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE: FUNCTIONAL
PARTICtpATION IN SOCIAL REGULATION 10-15 (2005) (summarizing the criticism of the EU as not
being sufficiently democratic and accountable to its members or the people). See also, WALTER
VAN GERVEN, THE EUROPEAN UNION: A POLITY OF STATES AND PEOPLES (2005) for similar
discussions of the democratic deficit.
50 CRAIG AND DE BURCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASE, AND MATERtALS at 296.
51 See Opinion 2/94, Re: Accession of the Community to the European Convention on
Human Rights, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1759.
52 CRAIG AND DE BlrRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASE, AND MATERtALS at 298-301.
53 See, e.g., Case IlnO, 1nternationale Handelgesellschaft v. Einfuhr und Vorratstelle fur
Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125.
54 Case 44n9, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz 1979 E.C.R. 3727.
55 Case 100/63, Kalsbeek v.Sociale Verzekeringsbank, 1964 E.C.R. 565.
56 Case 17n4, Transocean Marine Paint Association v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 1063.
57 Case 43n5, Defrenne v. Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455.
58 Case 4n3, Nord v. Commission 1974 E.C.R. 491. Compare, STUN SMISMANS, LAW,
LEGITIMACY, AND EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE: fuNCTIONAL PARTICIPATION IN SOCIAL REGULATION
II (2005) (denying that a common set of European values exist to hold the European Union
together).
59T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 138 (Oxford
University Press 1998).
60 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950,213 U.N.T.S. 220, available at
48
49
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and security of person,61 and a right to a public hearing and other
procedural protections if accused and charged with a crime. 62 Overall,
between the EU and the ECHR, individuals in the EU have fundamental
rights to be protected against an arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
D. INTERNATIONAL LAW

International law is composed of a host of traditions, conventions,
International law,
treaties, and other documents and practices. 63
especially international humanitarian and human rights law, also affords
protections to individuals against inhumane treatment, including torture
and illegal detention. 64 Among sources of international law that apply to
torture and the treatment of prisoners of war are the 1994 Convention
against Torture and the various Geneva Conventions governing the
treatment of combatants and noncombatants. 65 Finally, countries, such
as Israel, have had their highest courts declare torture to be illegal under
any circumstances. 66
E. SUMMARY

The United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union
share a set of values committed to limited government, protection of
individual rights, and the rule of law as basic precepts of governance. 67
The source of these values lies in domestic and transnational law,
traditions, and customs. They serve as a cornerstone for democratic
societies that place limits on the ability of a government, or an individual
in the government, to claim absolute or unchecked authority to act in
disregard of these values. In the post 9-11 world, choices made to
enhance security and to fight the war on terrorism challenged these
values in the United States and, to a lesser extent, in the United Kingdom
and across the European Union.

http://conventions.coe.intffreaty/enfTreaties/htmIl005.htm.
61 Id. at art. 5.
62 Id. at art. 6.
63 HELEN DuFFY, THE "WAR ON TERROR" AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 4-7 (2005).
MId. at 214, 217.

651d. at 282-92.
66 HC] 5100/94 The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government ofIsrael
[1999] IsrSC, 53(4) 817.
67 See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989) and 1-2 GIOVANNI
SARTORI, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY REVISITED (1987) for good summaries of the shared valued
of western European style democracies.
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II. PRESIDENT BUSH AND THE UNITED STATES

After 9-11, President Bush faced two choices. First, he could have
responded to the terrorist attacks as criminal acts or as acts of war.
Second, he could have acted within the law or asserted claims of extraconstitutional authority. In respect to the first choice, were he to have
chosen the criminal law route, his options could have included using the
United Nations, international law, the International Court of Justice, and
perhaps even the International Criminal Court as forums and bodies to
deal with terrorism and al-Qaeda, whose members could have been
prosecuted for various crimes including crimes against humanity.68
President Bush, however, chose war in two ways. The fIrst was a
war on al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the second was a war at home to
uncover intelligence about terrorists. First, in a speech of September 20,
2001, President Bush coined the phrase "war on terror" to describe his
response to the events of 9-11, as well as to his efforts to combat
terrorism around the world,69 and then on October 7, 2001, in another
speech, he announced the commencement of military strikes against alQaeda in Afghanistan. 7o Second, Bush opted not to respond to the events
of 9-11 within the law. Instead, in a series of memoranda7l his
administration offered a theory of a unitary presidency and claims of
extra constitutional presidential authority to support his militarized
response to terrorism. But the responses did not end there.
Within a short period of time after 9-11, Congress acted by passing
two major pieces of legislation. The fIrst was an act creating the
Department of Homeland Security, and the second was the Patriot Act. 72
Less visible or known responses at the time included several presidential
orders, including those related to the classification and treatment of
captured or suspected terrorists, and those ordering the National Security
Agency to wire tap phone calls. 73

68

DUFFY, THE 'WAR ON TERROR" AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW at 76-

93.
69 See President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People (Sept. 20, 200 I), http://www.whitehouse.gov/newslreleasesl 2001109/200109208.html.
70 See President George W. Bush, Presidential Address to the Nation (Oct. 7, 2001),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/newslreleasesl2001l10/200 II 007-8.html
(announcing
the
commencement of air strikes against the Taliban and al-Qaeda).
71 See Part II.
72 USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (200 I); Homeland Security Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
73 James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16,2005, at AI.
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While President Bush vowed to vanquish terrorism, he also declared
the lines demarcating victory. First, victory would not be achieved until
"every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and
defeated.,,74 Second, victory could not come at the price of America
compromising its basic values:
The object of terrorism is to try to force us to change our way of life,
is to force us to retreat, is to force us to be what we're not. And
that's-they're going to fail. They're simply going to fail. I want to
assure my fellow Americans that our determination-I say "our," I'm
talking about Republicans and Democrats here in Washington-has
never been stronger to succeed in bringing terrorists to justice,
protecting our homeland. Because what we do today will affect our
children and grandchildren.75

Exactly what the President meant by "our way of life" was unclear,
but possibly it included respect for the Constitution and Bill of Rights,
the rule of law, and individual rights and liberties.
A. THE BUSH PRESIDENCY AND THE WAR ON DEMOCRACY

For many, the "way of life" that Bush wished to preserve did not
seem to include a respect for democracy and constitutionalism, assuming
both terms incorporated protection for individual rights and liberties.
The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"), for one, has been
sharply critical of the Bush Administration, stating: "Throughout U.S.
history 'national security' has often been used as a pretext for massive
violations of individual rights. The terrorist attacks on September 11
mobilized our country in the fight against terrorism. However, the
attacks also launched a serious civil liberties crisis.,,76 People for the
American Way condemned the Patriot Act as launching a "war on terror
[that] could become a war on all American citizens" because of its failure
to provide "meaningful judicial review and respect due individual rights
and liberties.'m
Amnesty International has criticized the Bush
74 See President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People (Sept. 20, 200 I), http://www.whitehouse.gov/newslreleasesl2001/09/200109208.htm!.
75 See President George W. Bush, Presidential Address to the Nation (Oct. 7,2001),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/newslreleasesl2001/10120011007-8.html(announcing the
commencement of air strikes against the Taliban and al-Qaeda).
76 American Civil Liberties Union, http://www.aclu.org/natsec/index.html(last visited May
13,2008).
77 People for the American Way, USA Patriot Act: What's at Stake?,
http://www.pfaw.orglpfaw/generaVdefault.aspx?oid=9391 (last visited May 13,2008).
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Administration for its prolonged detention of individuals at Guantanamo
Bay,78 and the International Red Cross has decried the treatment of 9-11
detainees by the United States as a violation of international human
rights law. 79
To describe the full scope of civil liberties criticisms of Bush's war
on terrorism would take significant space. The criticisms are directed at
both international actions of the Bush Administration, as well as steps
taken internally. Internationally, the Bush Administration is criticized
for disregarding international humanitarian law. The criticism is rooted
in the Administration's refusal to afford captured al Qaeda and Taliban
fighters prisoner of war status. 80 Criticism has also been directed at the
Administration's failure to respect international conventions that ban
torture,81 and thereby encouraging mistreatment of prisoners at Abu
Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay.82 In addition, the United States has
refused to confirm or deny that the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA")
has held alleged terrorists in secret prisons in Eastern Europe where they
have been tortured. 83 Other reports have suggested that the United States
has targeted journalists and that, in fact, Bush suggested to Prime
Minister Tony Blair that they target Al Jazeera reporters and stations. 84
Domestically, many, such as the ACLU and People for the
American Way, as noted above, have criticized the Patriot Act as an
assault on individual rights and privacy. For example, an American
Library Association study reports that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation ("FBI") has made at least 200 inquiries to libraries
regarding reading material and patrons. 85 Prior to this study the
78 Amnesty International, Guantanarno detainees: 4 years without justice,
http://web.amnesty.orgJpages/usa-100106-action-eng (last visited May 13, 2008).
79 International Committee of Red Cross, US detention related to the events of II
September 2001 and its aftermath, http://www.icrc.orglWeblEng/siteengO.nsflhtml/usa-detentionupdate-I 2 I 205?OpenDocument (last visited May 13,2008).
80 See, e.g. HELEN DuFFY, THE "WAR ON TERROR" AND THE FRAMEWORK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 249-71 (2005).
81 See. e.g., id. at 348-73.
821d. at 348-73,382-85.
83 Stephen Grey and Doreen Carvajal, Secret Prisons in 2 Countries Held Qaeda Suspects.
Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2007, at A14; Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret
Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at AI. See also Lisbeth Kirk, European Courts May Challenge
US Terror Renditions, EU OBSERVER, Nov. 14,2005, http://euobserver.coml9/20314??print=1 ;
Craig Whitlock, Europe Wants Answers on CIA Camps, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2005, at Al (noting
European criticism that the CIA torture camps are illegal and may violate the European Convention
on Human Rights).
84 Alan Cowell, Britain Denies Memo Cited in Bush Treat, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18,2006, at
A6.
85 Eric Lichtblau, Libraries Say Yes. Officials Do Quiz Them About Users, N.Y. TIMES,
June 20, 2005, at All.
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government had not admitted to querying libraries, and, because the
Patriot Act prevents libraries from divulging whether they had been
contacted by law enforcement officials, little was known about how
frequently this authority to query libraries was invoked. 86 In addition,
several states passed resolutions critical of the Act's impact on civil
liberties,87 and critics in Congress, including Senators Russ Feingold,
Patrick Leahy, and Arlen Spector, were successful at the end of
December 2005, in preventing a reauthorization of sixteen expiring
provisions of the law,88 although eventually the Patriot Act was
reauthorized,89 supposedly after several problems in the original Act
were addressed. Among concern of many in Congress was that the law
90
allowed for spying on Americans without warrants.
Other criticisms of the Bush Administration grow out of a
December 16, 2005, New York Times story reporting that soon after the
9-11 attacks, President Bush issued an order authorizing the National
Security Agency to monitor international telephone conversations and emails by Americans in an effort to uncover links to al Qaeda and other
terrorist groupS.91 This monitoring or wiretapping was done without
court-approved warrants, as apparently required by the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. In response to this surveillance,
93
the ACLU92 and the Center for Constitutional Rights filed suits,
challenging these actions, alleging, among other things, that they violated
the First Amendment rights of their members and that the President
lacked authority to order this electronic monitoring. Efforts within the
Justice Department to examine this issue were also blocked by the
President. 94 While many in Congress expressed outrage to this
surveillance, in the summer of 2007 they authorized this activity.95
86 Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I., Using Patriot Act, demands library's Records, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
26,2005, at A12. (noting that at least one lawsuit challenging these queries, as well as the ban on
their disclosure by libraries, was filed on August 9,2005 by the ACLU).
87 Gary Fields and Ann Marie Squeo, Bipartisan Fix for Patriot Act Takes Shape, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 6, 2005, at A4.
88 Gary Fields and Ann Marie Squeo, Senate Blocks Patriot Act Renewals, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 17-18, 2005, at A3.
89 P.L. 109-170, 120 Stat. 3 (2006).
90 l d.
91 James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16,2005, at AI.
92 Complaint, Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp 2d 754
(E.D.Mich. 2006).
93 Complaint, Ctr. for Const. Rights v. Bush, No.1 :06-cv-313 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17,2006).
94 Neil A. Lewis, Bush Blocked Ethics Inquiry, Official Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,2006, at
A14.
95 Carl Hulse & Edmund L. Andrew, Democrats Feel Pressure on Spy Program, N.Y.
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The Bush Administration also had a secret program examining bank
records of potentially millions of Americans. 96 His administration has
been criticized for orders authorizing the detaining of both American
citizens and non-citizens suspected of being terrorists, when those
individuals are either denied access to attorneys (or have their
conversations with them monitored) or civil courtS. 97 Finally, The New
York Times reported that the FBI monitored numerous advocacy groups
after 9-11 without suspected terrorist connections, including Greenpeace
and People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals. 98
President, Bush's approach to civil liberties can best be captured by
his September 20, 2001 speech to Congress when he fIrst declared the
war on terrorism: "Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to
make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this
day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will
be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.,,99 Bush's
declaration of the war on terrorism, as well as his divisive you-are-withus-or-the-enemy statement, divided the world between good and evil,
posturing himself into the position of McCarthyiting any who would
oppose him or his measures. The cost of this McCarthyism is the war on
democracy and civil liberties.
B. PATRIOT ACT

The war on terrorism breached a wall traditionally distinguishing
foreign policy, national security, and intelligence gathering from
domestic law enforcement. 100 Domestic law enforcement is a policy area
TIMES, Aug. 5, 2007, at AI.
96 Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Bank Data Sifted in Secret by U.S. to Block Terror, N.Y.
TIMES, June 23, 2006, at AI.
91 Att'y. Gen. Order No. 2529-2001,66 Fed. Reg. 55,062 (Oct. 31, 2001).
98

Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Watched Activist Groups, New Files Show, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20,

2005, at AI.
99 President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American
People (Sept. 20, 200 I), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/re\easesl200 1/091200 10920-8.html.
100 See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES,
THE 9111 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (authorized ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 2004) [hereinafter 9/11
COMM' N REPORT) (stating that "[al central provision" of the Administration proposal that became
the Patriot Act "was the removal of 'the wall' on information sharing between the intelligence and
law enforcement communities"). See also Paul Rosenzweig, Civil liberty and the Response to
Terrorism, 42 DUQ. L. REV. 663, 688 (2004); Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency:
States of Exception and the Temptations of 9111, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 100 I, 1038 (2004); Peter
Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1306, 1327
(2004) (describing the goal of the Patriot Act as tearing down the wall between law enforcement and
foreign intelligence gathering).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2008

15

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 2

210

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

that must respect the constitutional protections and due process rights of
those suspected of committing crimes. These requirements include the
Fourth Amendment warrant and search and seizure requirements,101 the
Fifth Amendment rights to remain silent,102 and the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel,103 among other rights. However, foreign intelligence
gathering is generally exempt from a rigid application of these
protections. 104 As a result, if domestic law enforcement need only follow
the legal standards of foreign intelligence gathering, individual rights and
due process protections stand a good chance of being sacrificed. 105 One
of the first instances of how the Bush Administration subsumed crime
control under national security imperatives was in the Patriot Act.
Signed into law by President Bush on October 26, 2001, the Patriot
Act lO6 was described by President Bush as an important tool in the war
on terrorism.
The law was meant to overcome difficulties in
investigating acts of domestic terrorism by enhancing the capacity of
criminal justice officials to draw upon intelligence information. One
analyst has summarized the statute as follows:
The Act grants federal officials greater powers to trace and intercept
terrorists' communications both for law enforcement and foreign
intelligence purposes. It reinforces federal anti-money laundering
laws and regulations in effect to deny terrorists the resources
necessary for future attacks. It tightens our immigration laws to close

101 See generally, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
bars the use of illegally obtained evidence (without a search warrant) to convict an individual of a
crime); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
102 See generally Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment recognizes the right of a suspect in custody to remain silent); Miranda v Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966).
103 See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.s. 335 (1963) (holding that individuals
charged with a felony have a right to counsel, included an appointed one if indigent, under the Sixth
Amendment).
104 See, e.g, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936)
(stating that "[nleither the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in
foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens," foreclosed any claim by respondent to Fourth
Amendment rights. More broadly, he viewed the Constitution as a "compact" among the people of
the United States, and the protections of the Fourth Amendment were expressly limited to "the
people"); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez 494 U.S. 259, 266 ("The available historical data
show, therefore, that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to protect the people of the United
States against arbitrary action by their own Government; it was never suggested that the provision
was intended to restrain the actions of the Federal Government against aliens outside of the United
States territory").
lOS See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing liberties: Applying a Foreign Intelligence Model
to Domestic Low Enforcement, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1619, 1626 (2004).
Hl6 USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2002), (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ I
-1016 (2008 Westlaw).
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our borders to foreign terrorists and to expel those amongst us.
Finally it creates a few new federal crimes, such as the one outlawing
terrorists' attacks on mass transit; increases the penalties for many
others; and institutes several procedural changes, such as a longer
statute of limitations for crimes of terrorism. 107

Among the major provisions of the Act's more than 300 pages are
ten separate sections that revise intelligence gathering, immigration,
criminal justice, and money laundering laws as they relate to fighting
terrorism. 108 One sees in the Act a consolidation of crime control into
foreign intelligence gathering with the centralization of some domestic
investigations under the director of the CIA. 109
More specifically, among the major provisions of the Patriot Act,
section II amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978,
including authorization of disclosure or sharing of grand jury information
containing foreign intelligence to federal officials. 11O It also enhanced
the ability of the federal government to use pen registers to intercept
electronic communications, including the Internet, and for roving
surveillance of devices such as cell phones. III This information could
now be shared with the CIA director. 112 Another provision of Part II
provided delayed notification of required notices of execution of
warrants (the so called "sneak and peak" provision).113 Among the more
controversial features of the Act, it makes it possible to search many
private records, including medical and library information, without
having to show reasonable suspicion as required under the Fourth
Amendment. 114 The Act also permitted the searching of library records
and a ban of disclosure of such searches or inquiries. 115 Overall, the
Patriot Act has been criticized by many as threatening civil liberties and
indi vidual rights because it has unnecessarily conflated national security
107 CHARLES DOYLE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE USA PATRIOT ACT: A
LEGAL ANAL YSIS 54-57 (Apr. 15, 2002).
lOS Jennifer C. Evans, Hijacking Civil Liberties: the USA Patriot Act of 2001, 33 Loy. U.
CHI. L.J. 933, 965 (2002).

109 50 U.S.C.A. § 403-3(c)(6) (Supp. 2002). See also John W. Whitehead & Steven H.
Aden, Forfeiting "Enduring Freedom" for "Homeland Security:" A Constitutional Analysis of the
USA Patriot Act the Justice Department's Anti-terrorism Initiatives 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1081, 1091
(2002).
110 18 U.S.C.A § 203 (West law 2008).
11118 U.S.C.A §§ 204-09 (Westlaw 2008). Section 206 allows for wire tapping of specific
individuals and not just devices such as telephones.
112 18 U.S.C.A § 203(b) (Westlaw 2008).
113 18 U.S.C.A § 213 (Westlaw 2008).
18 U.S.C.A § 218 (Westlaw 2008).

114

lIS

18 U.S.C.A § 215 (Westlaw 2008).
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and domestic law enforcement standards." 6
C. ASSERTION OF PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS AND A UNIFIED
EXECUTIVE

Congress, through the Patriot Act, putatively gave the President the
authority to engage in increased domestic surveillance by way of
congressional fiat. In addition, a congressional joint resolution, the
Authorization to Use Military Force ("AVMF") of September 18, 2001,
authorized the President "to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001,... in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations, or persons.,,))7 It has been interpreted as granting the
President extensive power to respond to the terrorist attacks. 118
However, beyond congressional or legislative authorization, four Justice
Department- memoranda also asserted inherent or extra-constitutional
presidential power to respond to terrorism. These memoranda include a
September 25,2001 Department of Justice opinion written by John Yoo
which describing presidential war making powers ("the Y00
Memorandum"), and a second legal opinion of January 22, 2002
addressing the treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban detainees ("the
Detainee Memorandum,,).))9 The third memorandum is from August 1,
116 See, e.g., Jennifer C. Evans, Hijacking Civil Liberties: the USA Patriot Act of 2001 33
Loy. U. CHI. L.1. 933, 965 (2002); Jacob R. Lilly, National Security at What Price?: A Look into

Civil Liberty Concerns in the Information Age under the USA Patriot Act of 2001 and a Proposed
Constitutional Test for Future Legislation, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'y 447 (2003); Rita
Shulman, USA Patriot Act: Granting the U.S. Government the Unprecedented Power to Circumvent
American Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security, 80 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 427 (2003);
John W. Whitehead and Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting "Enduring Freedom" for "Homeland
Security:" A Constitutional Analysis of the USA Patriot Act and the Justice Department's Anti·
terrorism Initiatives 51 AM. U. L. REv. 1081, 1091 (2002).
117

Authorization for Use of Military Force § 2(a), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224

(2001).
118 Despite this resolution authorizing force, Congress also ambiguously stated in section 2
that the statutory authorization to use force arose from the War Powers Resolution and also in
section I that the president "has authority under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent
acts of international terrorism against the United States." Id. at §2(b). See also Curtis A. Bradley
and Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 2048,118 HARV. L.
REv. (2005) (discussing the legal implications of this resolution in tenns of the scope of presidential
power to respond to the events of 9·11).
119 John C. Yoo, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Memorandum
Opinion for the Deputy Counsel to the President Re: The President's Constitutional Authority To
Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists And Nations Supporting Them (Sept. 25, 2001)
[hereinafter Yoo Memorandum), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oIc/warpowers925.htm;Jay S.
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2002, reviewing the classification and treatment of al-Qaeda held outside
the United States, while the fourth is a January 19, 2006 Department of
Justice memorandum supporting President Bush's decision to order the
warrantless wiretapping of telephone conversations by the National
Security Agency.
These four memoranda, taken together, frame the Bush
Administration's arguments for its foreign policy and national security
authority post 9-11 by asserting a unitary conception of presidential
power that appears to be exempt from congressional oversight or
regulation in foreign affairs and in the conduct of war. While such an
argument for presidential power may be questionable itself, its
combination with the collapse of domestic criminal justice activity into
foreign affairs has resulted in a significant broadening of claims of
presidential powers in domestic and international affairs such that it
threatens basic constitutional norms and a respect for individual rights.

1.

September 25,2001 Memorandum, the Yoo Memorandum

The Y00 Memorandum argued that the president has extensive
inherent authority to use force against terrorists. 120 To substantiate this
claim, Y00 relied upon the structure of the Constitution, judicial and
executive construction of the Constitution, recent practice and tradition,
and finally congressional enactments authorizing use of force. 121 First, in
terms of the structure of the Constitution, Y 00 drew heavily upon the
Founders' constitutional intent, especially as glossed by Alexander
Hamilton in The Federalist. 122 For example, Yoo argued that:
The text, structure and history of the Constitution establish that the
Founders entrusted the President with the primary responsibility, and
therefore the power, to use military force in situations of emergency.
Article II, Section 2 states that the "President shall be Commander in
Bybee, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzalez,
Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes, General Counsel of the Department of Defense,
Re: Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 22, 2002), available
at http://news.lp.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/torture/powtorturememos.html.
120 The arguments found in this memorandum were subsequently elaborated upon in JOHN
C. YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9111
(2005).
121 Y00 Memorandum at I.
122 Yoo Memorandum at 2 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 122 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Charles R. Kesler ed., 1999) (stating regarding presidential war powers, that "the circumstances
which may affect the public safety are [notl reducible within certain determinate limits, ... it must
be admitted, as a necessary consequence that there can be no limitation of that authority which is to
provide for the defense and protection of the community in any matter essential to its efficiency.").
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Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of
the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United
States." U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. He is further vested with all of
"the executive Power" and the duty to execute the laws. U.S. Const.
art. II, § 1. These powers give the President broad constitutional
authority to use military force in response to threats to the national
security and foreign policy of the United States. During the period
leading up to the Constitution's ratification, the power to initiate
hostilities and to control the escalation of conflict had been long
understood to rest in the hands of the executive branch.123

For Yoo, the text of the Constitution, vests "full control" of military
powers in the president to direct military operations, even absent
congressional declarations of war. 124 The basis for this claim rested upon
a specific views of the presidency, again attributed to Hamilton, that
asserts that the constitutional text creates a unified executive power or
presidency.125 It is this unified conception of the presidency, along with
the conveyance of executive power to the president, and a historical view
of war powers and foreign policy activity as an executive function, that
gives the president the exclusive power that it has in national security and
defense issues. 126
Second, judicial and executive construction, according to the Yoo
Memorandum, also endorses a strong view of presidential power in
national security issues. In terms of executive construction, part n of
the Memorandum outlines numerous occasions where the Attorney
General or the Justice Department has supported presidential supremacy
if not exclusivity in this policy area. For example, Y00 cites opinions of
Attorneys General William Barr, Frank Murphy, and Thomas Gregory as
arguing that the president had inherent constitutional authority to commit
troops overseas, or to take military action without congressional
approval, in anticipation of events that would eventually lead to World
Wars I and n.127 Furthermore, Yoo argued, the judiciary has endorsed
these executive readings of the Constitution. 128 For example, in Mitchell
v. Laird,129 a district court, in ruling on the constitutionality of the
Vietnam War, stated that "there are some types of war which without
at 3 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 1-3.

123 Id.
I24

125 Yoo Memorandum at 2-3 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 392, No. 74, at 415
(Alexander Hamilton) (Charles R. Kesler ed., 1999).
l26yoo Memorandum at 3-4.
127Id. at 6.
I28 Id. at 8.
I29 Mitchell
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Congressional approval, the President may begin to wage: for example,
he may respond immediately without such approval to a belligerent
attack. ,,130
Appeal to practice and tradition is a third argument Yoo offered to
support presidential exclusivity in national security matters. Specifically,
Y00 cited what he claims are at least 125 times in American history
where troops have been committed overseas by the president without
congressional approval. 131 This deference to presidential authority is a
reflection, for Y00, of the practical needs of the Constitution to afford
flexibility in assigning responsibility in the area of national security. 132
Finally, Yoo pointed to both the War Powers Resolution and the
September 18, 2001 congressional resolution as also demonstrating
"Congress's acceptance of the President's unilateral war powers in an
emergency situation like that created by the September 11 incidents.,,133
Invoking Justice Jackson's famous concurrence in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. that presidential power in foreign affairs is at its maximum
when given legislative support by Congress, 134 according to Y00 these
two acts of Congress clearly endorse that the president has broad if not
exclusive and unlimited power to acts in foreign affairs and national
security matters.
What are the overall implications of the Yoo Memorandum? First,
as asserted in the conclusion of his memorandum, Y00 argued that the
president has "plenary constitutional power" to take military action, as he
deems appropriate, to respond to terrorist attacks. 135 This power is
inherent, Y00 argued, regardless of what Congress authorized in either
the War Powers or AUMF resolutions. 136 As subsequently articulated in
his book, Y00 views the president as having total control over foreign
and military powers, with Congress confined merely to either terminating
funding or authorization if it disapproves of what the executive branch
does.137 Third, Y00' s memorandum sketched out a theory of a unified
executive and president with strict separation of powers, again leaving no
room for Congress or the courts in the field of national security. Fourth,
Id. at 613.
Yoo Memorandum at 10.
132 Id.

130

131

133 Id.

at 15.
Id. at 14 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
my00 Memorandum at 17.
136 1d. Y 00 also cites the September 18, 200 I resolution as the September 14, 200 I
resolution.
134

137

JOHN C. Yoo, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN

AFFAIRS AFTER 9/1 I
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in the conclusion of the Memorandum Y00 also states that the president
can deploy troops not just to retaliate but to prevent future attacks, 138
thereby providing the rationale for the Bush Administration's claim of
"anticipatory self-defense" and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.
Finally, the Memorandum seemed to suggest, and actually did state, that
there appears to be no limit to presidential power in the field of national
security, thereby setting the stage for expansion of chief executive
authority to make claims for expanded capacity to act beyond the text of
the Constitution.
2.

January 22,2002 Memorandum, the Detainee Memo

A second legal opinion critical to the Bush Administration's
assertion of presidential power to undertake the war on terrorism is the
January 22,2002 memorandum addressing the treatment of al Qaeda and
Taliban detainees ("Detainee Memorandum"),139 which was drafted for
then Counsel to the President Alberto Gonzales by the Department of
Justice's Office of Legal Counsel. This memorandum sought to
ascertain the application of international treaties, such as the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War ("Geneva III")
and federal law to captured members of al Qaeda and the Taliban. 140
This memorandum concluded that Geneva III did not apply to al Qaeda
and that the president could also conclude that its protections do not
extend to members of the Taliban militia. 141
In seeking to analyze the applicability of Geneva III, the
Memorandum undertook a historical overview of the type of conflict and
participants the Convention was supposed to cover. In doing so, it first
noted that Geneva III structures "legal relationships between nationstates, not between nation-States and private, transnational or subnational
groups or organizations.,,142 Second, in examining the type of conflict
Geneva III (and all the other Geneva Conventions) were supposed to
cover, the Memorandum asserted that Geneva III is directed to a
"condition of civil war, or a large-scale armed conflict between a State

138 Y 00

Memorandum at 17.

Jay S. Bybee, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Memorandum for
Alberto R. Gonzalez, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes, General Counsel of the
Department of Defense, Re: Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees
22,
2002)
[hereinafter
Detainee
Memorandum),
available
at
(January
http://news.lp.findlaw.comlhdocs/docsltorturelpowtorturememos.html.
140 [d. at I.
139

141/d.
142

[d. at 4.
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and an armed movement within its own territory.,,143 Thus, the framers
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions only had in mind armed conflicts
between nation-states and civil war within a nation-state. l44 It is in these
types of armed conflicts, the memorandum argues, that Geneva III
should be read. 145
Having set this context, the Memorandum then reviewed a history
of warfare and conflict leading up to the 1949 Accords. It concluded
that only "state-centered" types of conflicts were envisioned in the
writing of Geneva III, and it is this type of warfare that the United States
had in mind when it ratified this treaty. 146 The Memorandum then
switches direction slightly, arguing that because state-centered conflict
was the type of warfare contemplated by Geneva ill, it did not apply to
all type of conflicts. Had "state parties ... intended the Conventions to
apply to all (emphasis in the original) forms of armed conflict, they could
have used broader, clearer language," according to the Memorandum. 147
But given the history and context at the time, the Memorandum argued,
the Geneva Convention drafters could not have contemplated that it
would address conflict between a nation-state and an international
terrorist group such as al Qaeda. 148 Therefore, the Memorandum
concluded, Geneva III does not apply to al Qaeda and they do not qualify
for prisoner of war ("POW") treatment. 149
Turning to the Taliban, the Memorandum noted that the application
of Geneva III to them was a more difficult legal question. 150 To resolve
this issue, the Memorandum noted that Article II of the Constitution
makes the president both Comrnander-in-Chief and vests in him the
executive power. 151 Relying on historical and textual arguments similar
to those found in the Yoo Memorandum, the Detainee Memorandum
asserted that the Constitution vests in the president independent plenary
foreign policy power, including any unenumerated powers that deal with
foreign affairs, including those that address treaties. 152 It concludes that
if treaty power is an executive function, and if the president has the

143/d . at 6.
144/d. at 7.
145

Detainee Memorandum at 7.

146/d. at 8.
147/d. (emphasis in the original)
148/d. at 8.
149/d. at 9.

at 10.
Detainee Memorandum at II.
152 /d. at I I.
150 /d.
151
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power alone to suspend or continue treaties,153 then he also has the lesser
power of temporarily suspending treaties. 154
Having argued that Geneva III only applies to nation-states and that
the president has plenary power to suspend (and, implicitly, to interpret)
treaties, the Memorandum argued that the president could conclude that
Afghanistan is a "failed state" or a state in which authority has
collapsed. 155 If, int fact the president could find that Afghanistan was a
failed state,156 he could then also decide that Geneva III does not apply
to the Taliban, and therefore temporarily suspend the treaty obligations
towards them. Under such circumstances, the Memorandum argued,
while Geneva III is not binding on the United States as a matter of
international law, 157 the president might apply it, or lesser standards, as a
matter of policy.15S
The significance of the Detainee Memorandum is great. First, it
relied on a logic of executive branch power in foreign affairs that
parallels the Yoo Memorandum. Second, it argued that POW status, as a
matter of law, does not have to be granted to either the al-Qaeda or
Taliban detainees. Third, it asserted that is a matter of policy to
determine what status al-Qaeda and Taliban captives should be afforded
and, therefore, what treatment they should receive. In terms of what
status and treatment they should receive, a January 25, 2002
Memorandum from Counsel to the President Alberto Gonzales to the
president ("the Application Memorandum") described the war against
terrorism as a "new kind of war.,,159 Because of that, the Application
Memorandum argued that the "new paradigm [of conflict] renders
obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners
and renders quaint some of its provisions" regarding their treatment. 160
153 Id. at 12 (citing Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. I (1793), reprinted in IS THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33, 39 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 19690 for this proposition).
154 ld. at 12-13.
155 1d. at IS.
156 ld. at 16-22 (discussing historical factors and conclusions, some of which were made by
the executive branch, concluding that Afghanistan and the Taliban regime constituted a failed state).
157 Detainee Memorandum at 23-25 does discuss whether a decision to suspend the treaty
would be valid under international law. Two arguments are made. First, any breaches of
international law would not be binding on domestic law in the United States. Id. Second, nothing in
the Geneva Conventions says that they cannot be temporarily suspended and therefore the president
may do this. Id.
158 1d. at 25.
159 Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Memorandum to the President Re:
Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with AI
Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Application Memorandum), available at
http://news.lp.findlaw.comlhdocs/docsltortureipowtorturememos.htmI.
160 Id. at 2.
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Finally, were the logic of this memorandum accepted, the president
would appear to be able to exempt anyone who tortures from criminal
liability anyone who tortures. 161 The Detainee and Application
Memoranda thus set the putative legal authority of the president to
classify both al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees as "enemy combatants"
who would be afforded presidentially-designated treatment at
Guantanamo Bay and other facilities outside the United States.

3.

August 1,2002 Memorandum, the Gonzales Memo

The August 1, 2002 Memorandum prepared by the Department of
Justice's Office of Legal Counsel for Counsel to the President Alberto
Gonzales discussed the standard of conduct or treatment for those
captured or detained as a result of the war on terrorism. 162 Better known
as the "torture memo," the memorandum examined what type of conduct
can be conducted in interrogations outside the United States, consistent
with the Convention Against Torture and 18 U.S.c. §§ 2340-2340A. 163
In summary, the Memorandum concluded that only acts of "extreme
nature"-equivalent to that found in death, organ failure, or serious
bodily injury--constitute torture and that merely cruel, inhumane, or
degrading action does not rise to the level of a violation of either the
1
Convention Against Torture or section 2340A. 164
To reach these conclusions, the Memorandum first turned to 18
U.S.C. § 2340A which makes it a criminal offense for anyone outside the
United States to commit, or attempt to commit, torture. 165 Torture is
defined in section 2340 as an "act committed by a person acting under
the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental
pain or suffering... upon another person.,,166 The Memorandum
contended that § 2340A applies only if the specific intent was to inflict
pain as the defendant's precise objective. 167 If, however, the defendant
acts with the belief that such pain was only reasonably likely as a result
of his actions, then there is only general intent and therefore the act does
161

Harold Hongju Koh, Can the President Be Torturer in Chief?, 81 IND. L. J. 1145, 1151

(2006).
162 Jay S. Bybee, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Memorandum for
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18
U.s.c. §§2340-2340A (Aug. I, 2002) [hereinafter Gonzales Memorandum], available at
http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-srv/ nati on/documents!doj i nterrogationmem02002080 I .pdf.
163 1d. at I.
164ld.

Id. at 2.
l d. at 3.
167 Id. at 3-4.

165

166
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168
not apply as torture under the law.
Thus, if the goal is to inflict serve
pain, then it is torture, but if in the course of interrogation pain is
inflicted in order to extract information, that does not qualify as torture
because inflicting pain was not the goal of the conduct. 169
Second, the Memorandum noted that only "severe pain" is barred
by section 2340. 170 In seeking to interpret what severe pain is, the
Memorandum drew upon 18 U.S.c. §2340A to conclude that it
encompasses only severe mental pain or suffering, threat of imminent
death, or the use of drugs which profoundly disrupt the senses or
personality. 171
The Memorandum next turned to the Convention Against Torture
("CAT") to ascertain what it prohibits. The Memorandum again noted
that the CAT prohibits only severe pain or suffering,172 but unlike section
2340, does not appear to have a specific intent requirement. 173 However,
to support a reading that CAT only applies to extreme forms of physical
or mental harm, the Memorandum appealed to executive branch
interpretations of the treaty. It cited Reagan Administration views that
the interrogation must use deliberate and calculated techniques "intended
to inflict excruciating and agonizing physical or mental pain or
suffering." 174
Finally, after a brief review of how other bodies and states have
viewed torture,175 the Gonzales Memorandum then articulated a similar
logic regarding preSidential power as found in the Y 00 Memorandum.
Specifically, the former contended that even if interrogation methods
used violated section 2340A, this statute would be unconstitutional
because it interfered with the president's "core war powers.,,176 Because
the president enjoys "complete discretion" in terms of how to use his
commander-in-chief powers and because executive power is invested in

168
169

Gonzales Memorandum at 4.
[d.

170

[d. at 5.

171

[d. at7-11.

172

[d. at 14.
[d.

173

Gonzales Memorandum at 16 (citing S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, at 4-5 (1988)). See
also Gonzales Memorandum at 20 (dismissing non-executive branch interpretations by stating that
beyond "statements of Executive branch officials, the rest of the ratification record is oflittle weight
in interpreting a treaty"). Presumably this statement encompasses Senate debate on the Convention
Against Torture.
175 Gonzales Memorandum at 27-31 (noting also how such international decisions are not
binding on the United States).
176 [d. at 31. See also id. at 38 (arguing that "capturing, detaining, and interrogating
members of the enemy" is a core function of the Commander in Chief).
174
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the president,177 laws, including section 2340A, the memorandum argues,
must be read so as note to interfere with his constitutional authority. 178
To summarize, the memorandum argues that section 2340A only
applies to severe physical or mental suffering if the specific intent is to
inflict this type of pain. Additionally, presidential interpretations of CAT
only bar this type of infliction of pain. Third, even if section 2340A does
apply, it would be unconstitutional if it also interfered with presidential
war-making powers. How do we know if it does interfere? It seems
mere presidential declaration that it does is sufficient.
4.

January 19, 2006 Memorandum, the Wiretapping Memo

The fourth memorandum that frames the Bush Administration's
legal justification for the war on terrorism is the January 19, 2006
Memorandum defending the president's ability to order wiretapping of
telephone
conversations
without
a
warrant
("Wiretapping
Memorandum"). 179
On December 16, 2005, the New York Times broke a story reporting
that soon after the 9-11 attacks, President Bush issued an order
authorizing the National Security Agency ("NSA") to monitor
international telephone conversations and e-rnails by Americans in an
effort to uncover links to al Qaeda and other terrOl;ist groups. 180 This
monitoring or wiretapping was done without court-approved warrants, as
apparently required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978. 181 Subsequently, on December 17, President Bush acknowledged
that he ordered the spying,182 with the exact scope of the number of
individuals or communication spied on unknown. 183
Significant

Id. at 33.
1d. at 34.
179 V.S. Department of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National
Security Agency Described by the President (January 19, 2006) [hereinafter Wiretapping
Memorandum], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf.
180 James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16,2005 at AI.
181 Id. See also Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (UFISA") as amended, 50 V.S.C.A.
§§ 1801-1862 (2000 & Supp. II 2002). Passed in light of revelations that Richard Nixon had ordered
domestic spying on personal enemies and reporters, FISA constructed a process whereby the
president could obtain a warrant from a special federal court to place wiretaps telephones and other
communication devices, if needed for national security and intelligence gathering reasons. In some
cases, the wiretaps could be authorized prior to a warrant being issued, but one had to be obtained
from the special court within three days.
182 David E. Sanger, In Speech, Bush Says He Ordered Domestic Spying, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
18,2005, at AI.
183 James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Spy Agency Mined Vast Data Trove, Officials Report,
177

178
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controversy followed this revelations of spying, with members of
Congress, such as Senator Arlen Spector, contending that the president
had violated FISA. This forced the president to defend the program
numerous times, culminating in the January 19,2006 memorandum.
The Wiretapping Memorandum retraced similar ground as the other
three memoranda in terms of assertions of presidential power. It too
cited the Article II vesting of the executive and commander-in-chief
powers in the president as creating a unitary chief executive who is
preeminent in the field of national security and defense. l84 In addition to
again relying heavily upon Alexander Hamilton's views on executive
power,185 the Wiretapping Memorandum also relied upon dicta in United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation l86 describing the president
as the "sole organ of the nation in its external relations. ,,187
The Memorandum then concluded that because of his preeminent
authority in national affairs, "a consistent understanding has developed
that the President has inherent constitutional authority to conduct
warrantless searches and surveillance within the United States for foreign
intelligence purposes.,,188 To support this conclusion, the Memorandum
cited legal opinions by previous attorneys general 189 as well as lower
federal court opinions l9o and Supreme Court dicta. 191 After asserting this
inherent presidential power, the Wiretapping Memorandum, like the
other three Memoranda, cited the September 18, congressional
Authorization to Use Military Force as additional support for the
president to order warrantless wiretaps. More importantly, it is this
congressional authorization that was viewed by the Memorandum as
provideing the legal justification to bypass FISA. 192
According to the Wiretapping Memorandum, FISA regulates
electronic surveillance when it is in the context of gathering foreign

N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005, at AI.
I84 WireIapping Memorandum at 6-7.
I85 Id.at7.
186 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
187 299 U.S. at 319; Wiretapping Memorandum at 6.
188WireIapping Memorandum at 7.
189/d. at 8.
190 /d. See also United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
191 United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement applies to investigations of domestic threats to security). The
WireIapping Memorandum at 8, argues that because the Court had not ruled on the President's
authority to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance without a warrant and that subsequently lower
courts had concluded the president could do this, therefore he did have this authority.
192 WireIapping Memorandum at 2.
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intelligence information. 193 The Act requires the Attorney General to
obtain a warrant from a special court of Article ill judges if it wishes to
engage in electronic surveillance. In addition, FISA requires that the
warrant application must show probable cause to believe the person or
agent targeted is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power. The NSA
must also certify that the information sought is foreign intelligence and
that it cannot be obtained by normal domestic means. l94 According to
the Wiretapping Memorandum, Congress did not intend FISA either to
limit presidential power in time of war, or to prohibit him from engaging
in all forms of electronic surveillance. 195 Instead, section 109 of FISA
only prohibits such surveillance "except as authorized by statute. ,,196
The September 18, 2001 congressional AUMF resolution, according to
the Memorandum, is then described as a "statute" authorizing electronic
surveillance within the meaning of section 109 of FISA.,,197 Finally, the
Memorandum argued that even if there are questions about whether
FISA or the Fourth Amendment '98 barred the wiretapping, the
interpretive rule of seeking to avoid constitutional questions should
weigh on the side of the president's authority. 199
In sum, the surveillance of telephone and e-mail communications is
legal because: 1) the president has inherent power to act in national
affairs; or 2) FISA does not prevent it;200 or 3) FISA allows for some
exceptions and Congress authorized it with its September 18 resolution;
or 4) the Fourth Amendment does not apply to foreign intelligence
gathering or NSA activities; or 5) the rule of constitutional avoidance
should weigh in favor of executive authority.

193

[d. at 18.

194 [d.;

See also 50 U.S.c.A. §§ 1803-1805 (Westlaw 2008).
Memorandum at 19-20.
196[d. at 20 (italics in the original).
197 [d. at 23.
195 Wiretapping

198 [d. at 36-38 (dismissing Fourth Amendment objections by asserting that the courts have
affirmed presidential authority to gather foreign intelligence without a warrant, or that the warrant
requirement does not apply to activities of the NSA).
199 [d. at 28.
200 Compare, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") as amended, 50 U.S.C.A.
§204 (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (stating that "nothing in code provisions regarding pen registers shall
be deemed to affect the acquisition by the Government of specified foreign intelligence information,
and that procedures under FISA shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance and
the interception of domestic wire and oral (current law) and electronic communications may be
conducted") (italics added).
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Presidential Signing Statements

Presidential signing statements have been tactically used by the
Bush Administration to reinforce executive power, especially in the areas
of foreign policy and military affairs. These statements, issued at the
time when the president signs a bill, have been around since the early
days of the republic. 201 However, it was Attorney General Edwin Meese
during the Reagan presidency who pushed the idea of using signing
statements as a way of interjecting the intent or understanding of the
president regarding what a particular law meant. The hope was to then
have this interpretation of the law guide judicial construction of it in
court. 202 Yet the Bush presidency has transformed the signing statements
into a major tool to defend its conception of presidential power as
articulated in the four Memoranda.
Since taking office, the Bush Administration has used these signing
statements to claim authority to disobey or ignore the law in more than
203
750 situations.
In an earlier statistical analysis of these signing
statements, Phillip Cooper found that of the 505 signing statements,
eighty-two regarded authority to supervise a unitary executive, seventyseven pertained to exclusivity of presidential power in foreign affairs,
forty-eight dealt with presidential power to classify national security
information and withhold information, and thirty-seven addressed
204
commander-in-chief issues.
Not surprisingly, the signing statements
clumped around foreign policy and defense issues. Among the more
prominent signing statements, is one indicating that the president did not
have to comply with the McCain Amend~ent205 that barred U.S. officials
from using torture, cruel, and inhuman treatment against prisoners. 206
These signing statements echo many of the themes addressed in the
memoranda defending presidential exclusivity and supremacy in foreign
policy and defense matters. 207 For example, in his signing statement
addressing the McCain Amendment, Bush asserted:

201 Phillip J. Cooper, George W Bush, Edgar Allen Poe, and the Use and Abuse of
Presidential Signing Statements, 35 PRES. STUDIES Q. SIS, 516-20 (2005).
202ld.

203

See Charles Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of wws, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30,

2006, at AI.
204 Cooper,

35 PRES. STUDIES Q. at 522.
205 42 V.S.c.A. §§ 2000dd, 2000dd-1 (Westlaw 2008).
206 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, RECOMMENDATION AND REPORT OF TASK FORCE ON
PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE 16 (Aug. 8, 24,
2006).
2m ld.
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The executive branch shall construe Title X in Division A of the Act,
relating to detainees, in a manner consistent with the constitutional
authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch
and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitutional
limitations on the judicial power, which will assist in achieving the
shared objective of the Congress and the President, evidenced in Title
X, of protecting the American people from further terrorist attacks.
Further, in light of the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court of
the United States in 2001 in Alexander v. Sandoval, and noting that
the text and structure of Title X do not create a private right of action
to enforce Title X, the executive branch shall construe Title X not to
create a private right of action. Finally, given the decision of the
Congress reflected in subsections 1005 (e) and 1005(h) that the
amendments made to section 2241 of title 28, United States Code,
shall apply to past, present, and future actions, including applications
for writs of habeas corpus, described in that section, and noting that
section 1005 does not confer any constitutional right upon an alien
detained abroad as an enemy combatant, the executive branch shall
construe section 1005 to preclude the Federal courts from exercising
subject matter jurisdiction over any existing or future action, including
applications for writs of habeas corpus, described in section 1005. 208

Within this statement is an assertion of a unitary presidency and of
presidential supremacy within foreign and military affairs. In effect, the
statement indicates a willingness to disregard the Amendment. Thus,
characteristic of the Bush signing statements that distinguish them from
previous presidents is that they are not merely ceremonial, rather they
envision a decision not to comply with the law. 209
Legally, there are several problems with these statements. As the
American Bar Association points out, there is no constitutional
authorization for these statements in the sense that they create new
authority for the president. Either the president can sign or veto a bill,
but there is no authority to sign and then issue a statement indicating
unwillingness to comply.2ID A second issue is that even if the president
can issue these statements, what effect should they be given when the
courts construe a statute? According to Neil Kinkopf, in Supreme Court
decisions dating back to John Marshall, a "President's interpretation of
208 President's Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, the Department of Defense, Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza
Act, 2006, 41 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 1918 (Dec. 30, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/newslreleasesl2005/12120051230-8.html.
209AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, RECOMMENDATION AND REPORT OF TASK FORCE ON
PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE at 7 -10.
2101d. ,at5,9, 19.
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his own authority was not entitled to deference and was to be given no
weight in construing a statute.,,211 Kinkopf, also points out that
historically, the Court has interpreted presidential power in foreign
affairs against a background of international law. 212 This interpretive
strategy is contrary to the understanding of executive power asserted in
the memoranda. Finally, the authority asserted by Bush in these signing
statements is contrary to what the Court stated in Cooper v. Aaron213 in
reference to Marbury v. Madison: "This decision declared the basic
principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law
of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by
this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of
our constitutional system.,,214 Whatever the Bush administration may
think, its interpretation of the law through these signing statements is
neither definitive nor controlling upon the judiciary.
D. SUMMARY

Overall, the four memoranda discussed above and the signing
statements rest upon a conception of presidential power that appears to
place the office beyond congressional or judicial limits or control when it
comes to national defense or security. Collectively, they give the
president near unlimited authority to interpret treaties, deploy troops, or
take any other action to protect national security. As a result of this
assertion of presidential power, it set the stage not simply for a war on
terrorism, but one on democracy, constitutionalism, and international
law.
How accurate is this sketch of presidential power which is described
as the unitary executive theory? There is no question that it offers a
wooden theory of the presidency that emphasizes a strict separation of
powers model of government. The subsequent Y00 book concludes that
the War Powers Act is unconstitutional for the same reason. But more
troubling are several of Yoo's assumptions. For one, as later articulated
in his book, Y00 draws questionable conclusions based upon silence. For
example, he asserts: "If we think of the allocation of war powers among

211 Neil Kinkopf, The Statutory Commander in Chief, SI INDIANA L.
(2006) (citing Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, liS
Seeman, 5 U.S. I Cranch I, 10 (ISOI)).
212 Kinkopf, SI INDIANA L. 1. at 1192 (citing Schooner Chorming Betsy,
at liS).
213 Cooper v. Aaron, 35S U.S. I (l95S).
214 Cooper, 35S U.S. at IS (discussing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(lS03)).
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the British and colonial governments as the background on which state
constitutions were drawn, state silence suggests an acceptance of the
British approach.,,215 Inferring from silence is always a precarious move,
and too much of the reasoning of the book does that.
Another problem with Yoo's analysis is its effort to freeze and
unfreeze the meaning of the Constitutional text at the same time. Y00
starts with questionable discussions of how Hamilton (who barely
attended the Constitutional Convention and whose views on presidential
power were not taken seriously even by the framers) viewed the
Constitution. He then moves to how the ratifiers viewed foreign affairs
and national security. He then argues that he will not rely as much on
subsequent case law (which does not consistently support him) to show
how foreign policy power must be vested in plenary fashion in the
president while decision making remains open to contemporary
demands. Each of these steps contains questionable history and dubious
logic.
In addition, one is left asking ifs the Constitution's meaning on
national security issues fixed or open, and if open, why does it seem to
consistently favor the presidency over Congress? In supporting his view
of presidential power, Yoo consistently relies upon questionable
executive department self-interested assertions of authority, with such
articulations bearing little weight in law or objectivity. Moreover, no
thought is given either to how American conceptions of constitutionalism
differed from British views by 1787, or how the Constitution of 1787 and
it augmentation of power was rebalanced by the subsequent adoption of
the Bill of Rights in 1791 and future amendments. Overall, as aptly
stated by Justices Scalia and Stevens dissenting in Hamdi v. Rumsjeld216
after reviewing the historical efforts in England to limit monarchial
power and in the American colonies to address the abuses of King
George III, "A view of the Constitution that gives the Executive
authority to use military force rather than the force of law ... flies in the
face of the mistrust that engendered these provisions.,,217
Conversely, one can invoke text, framers' intent, scholarly
commentary, and history to refute Yoo. For example, the plain language
of the text of the Constitution argues against Yoo's claim that Congress
has a minimal role in foreign policy and war activities. Article I, section
215 John C. Yoo, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Memorandum
Opinion for the Deputy Counsel to the President Re: The President's Constitutional Authority To
Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists And Nations Supporting Them (Sept. 25, 2001)
[hereinafter Yoo Memoranduml, at 62, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olclwarpowers925.htm.
216
542 U.S. 507 (2004).
217 Id. at 569 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
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8 contains no less than ten clauses that recognize Congress' authority in
these activities, including the power to declare war. Article II, section 2
only vests in the president three powers in these areas - serve as
commander-in-chief, and make treaties and appoint ambassadors - with
the latter requiring concurrent Senate approval. 218
The Framers' intent also speaks against Y00' s interpretations. For
example, Alexander Hamilton argued at the constitutional convention for
extensive presidential powers in war making, but even here he noted that
the executive would have the power "to make war or peace, with the
advise of the senate.,,219 But later in Federalist No. 69 he downplayed
presidential power, stating that he would be commander-in-chief "when
called into actual service of the United States.,,220 Neither of these
statements seem to support the idea that even Hamilton supported giving
presidents the power Y00 asserts. Others, moreover, at the convention221
and in ratification debates,222 also expressed skepticism and concern
about vesting war making power in the president.
Both scholarly analysis and history argue against Y00' s positions.
For example, Fisher argues that while the Framers knew of the British
model to vest war making and military power in the king, they firmly
rejected doing that both in the Articles of Confederation and in the
Constitution. 223 In fact, Fisher notes how Article 9 of the Articles of
Confederation transferred all war and foreign policy power to Congress,
thereby representing the sharpest indication of their desire to break with
the British model. 224 Thus, by the time the new Constitution came about,
executive power in this area was already limited, subject to whatever the
Convention decided to give back to the president. Moreover, when it
comes to the phrase "commander-in-chief," both Louis Fisher and Louis
Henkin contend that this phrase was meant to do no more than to ensure
that the military remained under civilian control during wars that would
See generally U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
219 I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 300 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.
1966) (emphasis added).
221lTHE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 447 (Modern Library 1937) (emphasis added).
221 I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 6S (quoting James Madison
indicating that John Rutledge, while preferring a single president, did not want to give him the
"power of war and peace"); and JAMES MADISON, NOTES ON THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787476 (Adrienne Koch ed., Norton Library 1969) (quoting Roger Sherman:
"The Executive should be able to repel and not to commence war"). Note also that the convention
delegates vote to reject giving the president war making power. [d.
222 Patrick Henry and James Madison Debate Constructive Rights and the Use of the
Militia, in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTlTUTION,70I-03 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) (describing how
only Congress could call out the militia).
223 LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 2 (2004).
224/d. at 2.
218
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be initiated by Congress, and after they authorized the troops. 225
Whatever history Y00 offers to support his views, recent events such as
the passage of the War Powers Act and the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, indicate that past acquiescence to giving presidents
broad leeway in military and foreign policy arenas has met legislative
disapproval in Congress.
Finally, one can respond to Yoo and the memoranda by appealing to
the core values of democracy, constitutionalism, and liberalism. As
Dyzenhaus argues, there are moral principles operating in the law that
cover situations similar to what Ronald Dworkin proposed when
criticizing legal positivism. 226 What this means for Dyzenhaus is that
emergencies do not create constitutional black holes devoid of legal or
moral guidance.227 Instead, the exercise of authority, even by the
president in times of emergencies, should still respect rule of law, the
concept of checks and balances, and respect for rights.
In is
inconceivable that assertions of a unitary executive unchecked by the
legislative and judicial branches, and able to disregard rights, are
compatible with the core values of democracy, constitutionalism, and
Liberalism. At their core, these values stand for limits on power,
regardless of who is acting and for what reason. The constitutional
framers created a president, not a king or dictator, and it is unlikely that
they would have endorsed this assertion of executive power. Instead, as
the constitutional provision for the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus demonstrates, the Constitution seems to anticipate emergencies
and incorporates them into how it operates. Nowhere does the
Constitution either explicitly or implicitly endorse the idea that its
provisions operate only in times of peace and tranquility.
In sum, the four memoranda of the Bush Administration, as well as
the ideas implicit in the signing statements, rest on very weak
foundations. They mythologize presidential authority, foisting an image
of executive power in conflict with democratic, liberal, and constitutional
values that support limited government, rule of law, and respect for
individual rights.
III. AMERICAN DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL AND THE COURTS' RESPONSE

The Bush Administration's war on terrorism can be judged on two
mId. at 12-14; LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, 23 (1990).
226

DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW 61-62 (2006).

See also RONALD

DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, 27 (1978).
227

DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LA W at 61-62, 196-200.
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fronts. First, one can ask if the terrorists have won. President Bush said
that the object of the terrorists was to "force us to change our way of life,
is to force us to retreat, is to force us to be what we're not.,,228 Has the
war on terrorism precipitated a war on democracy, including basic civil
liberties? Taken together, the Patriot Act and the presidential assertions
of power do threaten American democracy, and the Supreme Court has
responded, although not directly, with a mixed record of rejecting many
of Bush's claims.
Second, one can judge the war on democracy in terms of success.
Have President Bush's efforts led to the capture and conviction of
terrorists? For the most part, the war on terrorism has not produced the
capture or conviction of major al Qaeda or Taliban principals, and it has
also thwarted international cooperation in securing the same.
Thus far the United States Supreme Court has ruled in four cases
addressing legal issues stemming from the war on terrorism and the
president's assertion of presidential power. In the first three, the Court
has generally rejected Bush's broad claims of presidential authority,
although a majority of the Justices have been unwilling to directly
challenge assertions of a unitary president and supremacy in foreign
affairs and war making powers. In addition to the Supreme Court,
several lower courts have also heard various challenges to legal claims
arising out of the war on terror, yielding few victories for President
Bush.229
A. HAMDI V. RUMSFEW

In Hamdi v. Rumsjeld230 the Supreme Court ruled that an American
citizen could not be held indefinitely on American soil without a right to
habeas corpus review. The decision limited the ability of the President to
detain American citizens in the war on terrorism after September 11,
2001, and it reaffirmed the basic right of Americans to have a judge
determine whether they have been illegally detained.
Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen, was captured in Afghanistan,
and was classified as an "enemy combatant" because he had supposedly
228 See President's Remarks Prior to a Meeting With Congressional Leaders and an
Exchange With Reporters, 37 WEEKLY CaMP. PRES. Doc. 1538 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/newslreleasesl20011l0/20011023-33.htm!.
229 American Civil Liberties Union v. National Sec.Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 782 (D.
Mich. 2006) (ruling unconstitutional the president's warrant less electronic surveillance program,
finding that it violated both the First and Fourth Amendments). The decision was later vacated on
standing reasons by the Sixth Circuit in 2007. American Civil Liberties Union v. National
Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 2007).
230 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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taken up arms against the United States. 231 Hamdi was placed in
indefinite detention in a naval brig in South Carolina, and denied access
to legal counsel. Hamdi's father sought habeas corpus review for his son
in federal court, claiming that the incarceration violated the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 232 The district court ruled in favor of Hamdi,
ordering him released, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Hamdi was entitled to a
hearing before a neutral decision maker to determine the factual basis for
why he was being held and remanded for such a hearing.233
Justice O'Connor wrote for a four person plurality that also included
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer. In this
opinion O'Connor fIrst stated that: "The threshold question before us is
whether the Executive has the authority to detain citizens who qualify as
"enemy combatants.,,234 O'Connor indicated the president asserted that
he has inherent Article II authority to detain individuals, but the Court
decided not to address this issue, instead it focused on whether the
detention is permitted, pursuant to the September 18 congressional
Authorization to Use Military Force ("AUMF,,).235 Citing Ex parte
Quirin236 for the proposition that American citizens may be held as
enemy combatants,237 the plurality stated that Congress could not do this
indefinitely. 238 Moreover, even recognizing the power of Congress to
fIght the war on terrorism and authorize the detention of those considered
to be enemy combatants, the opinion noted that the basic principles of
federal habeas corpus law grant American citizens being detained on
American soil-even though captured on foreign soil during combatsome right to contest the factual basis for why they are being
incarcerated. 239
Justice O'Connor also addressed a second claim made by the
president that the courts should not second guess him when it comes to
decisions made regarding military matters. While acknowledging the
important separation of powers argument here and the respect that the
courts ought to afford the president when it comes to sensitive foreign

at 510.
232 542 ld. at 510-11.
233 1d. at 509.
234 ld. at 516.
235 1d. at 516-17 (noting how Congress did authorize Hamdi's detention with the AUMF).
236 317 U.S. I, 20 (1942).
237 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519.
238 1d. at 520-23.
239ld. at 525.
2311d.
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policy and military matters,240 O'Connor stated that the interest Hamdi
had in the protection of his rights outweighed the interest the government
had in detaining him without granting access to the courtS. 241 In short,
O'Connor and the four person plurality opinion did not see judicial
review of Hamdi's detention as posing a major threat or having a "dire
impact" upon the government's war making functions. 242
In sum, Justice O'Connor's opinion rejected many of the separation
of powers arguments made by President Bush, including those related to
minimal questioning of an expansive presidential power by the courts:
[W]e necessarily reject the Government's assertion that separation of
powers principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts
in such circumstances. Indeed, the position that the courts must forgo
any examination of the individual case and focus exclusively on the
legality of the broader detention scheme cannot be mandated by any
reasonable view of separation of powers, as this approach serves only
to condense power into a single branch of government. We have long
since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the
President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S., at 587, 72 S.Ct. 863. Whatever
power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its
exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of
conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when
individual liberties are at stake. 243

For the plurality, the "war power does not remove constitutional
limitations safeguarding essentialliberties,,,244 thereby placing a limit on
any congressional authority to detain Hamdi.
In a separate concurrence, Justices Souter and Ginsburg generally
agreed with the O'Connor opinion, but they also questioned whether the
congressional resolution authorized Hamdi's detention. 245 Specifically,
they cite the Non-Detention Act246 (18 U.S.c. § 4001(a)) which places
limits upon the ability of Congress to authorize the detention of
American citizens. 247 This act, passed in response to the internment of

240 ld. at 527 (describing the Bush Administration's position as the "most extreme
rendition" of a separation of powers argument).
241 ld. at 533.
242ld.

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535-36.
at 536.
245 l d. at 541.
243

244 ld.

246

18 U.S.C.A § 4001 (a) (Westlaw 2008).
542 U.S. at 542.

247 Hamdi,
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Japanese-Americans during World War II, requires very clear and
manifest authority by Congress before the president could detain
American citizens. In this case, Souter and Ginsburg did not see that
clear authority in the AUMF. 248
Finally, in dissent, Justices Scalia and Stevens take an even stronger
position than the plurality and concurring opinions when it comes to the
constitutionality of Hamdi being held without review. For Scalia and
Stevens, each writing their own concurrence, a trial for treason is the
traditional way to try citizens who have waged war against the United
States. 249 If this option is not selected, then every citizen is entitled to a
habeas corpus review of the reasons of detention, unless Congress has
suspended that right. 25o Given that Congress had not suspended the writ
of habeas corpus, the dissent concluded that the AUMF cannot permit an
indefinite detention of an American citizen.251 Moreover, the Scalia
dissent also rejects the contention that the president, even in wartime, has
the power to order an indefinite detention of a citizen. 252
B. RASUL V. BUSH

The Hamdi opinion was issued the same day that Rasul v. Bush 253
was decided. In Rasul v. Bush the United States Supreme Court ruled
that aliens being held in confinement at the American military base in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba were entitled to have a federal court hear
challenges to their detention under the federal habeas corpus statute.
As a result of United States military action after 9-11 in Afghanistan
against al Qaeda and the Taliban, approximately 640 non-Americans
were captured and then relocated to the United States military base at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba where they were held indefinitely, and without
access to legal counsel and the federal courtS. 254 Among those detained,
claiming innocence, and wishing to be freed, were Shafiq Rasul and
Fawzi Khallid Abdullah Fahad Al Odah, neither of whom were United
States citizens.255
Relatives of these two individuals filed actions in U.S. District
248 1d.
2491d.

at 54748.
at 554.

2SO /d.
251/d.

at 573-74.

mid. at 568 (stating that the "proposition that the Executive lacks indefinite wartime
detention authority over citizens is consistent with the Founders' general mistrust of military power
permanently at the Executive's disposal").
m 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
254 /d. at 470-72.

mid.
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Court for the District of Columbia, challenging the detentions. First the
federal district court and then the Ccourt of Aappeals for the District of
Columbia dismissed the cases, claiming that the courts lacked
jurisdiction to hear the challenges. In both of these cases relatives of the
detainees sought habeas corpus review, but it was denied. 256
Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens ruled that these detainees
were entitled to a review of their detention. Stevens first noted that
habeas corpus is the constitutional right of individuals to have a judge
review the reasons why a person has been detained. 257 Habeas corpus is
the legal means individuals may use to challenge what they think may be
an illegal imprisonment by requesting that the person holding them
explain to a judge the reasons for their confinement. Both Article I,
Section 9, Clause 2 of the Constitution, as well as 28 U.S.c. § 2241
provide for habeas corpus review. 258 While the law is well established
that American citizens being held in the United States are entitled to
habeas corpus review, there seemed to be some uncertainty regarding
whether noncitizens held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba enjoyed habeas
review. 259
One issue is was the status of Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and
whether it was sovereign territory of the United States. In 1934 Cuba
granted the United States a lease to Guantanamo Bay so long as the
based was being used. In turn, the United States recognized Cuba's
sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay?60 Stevens concluded that the control
of the base by the United States was so "plenary and exclusive,,261 that
while Guantanamo Bay was not sovereign territory of the United States,
it was still under its jurisdiction and therefore the ruling in Johnson v.
Eisentrager262 did not apply.263 In Eisentrager the Court had ruled that
the courts lacked jurisdiction to grant habeas relief to German citizens
captured by U.S. forces in China who were tried and convicted of war
crimes by an American military commission headquartered in Nanking,
and then incarcerated in occupied Germany?64 In distinguishing the
facts in that case from Rasul, the Court stated:

2561d.
2571d.

at 472-73.
at 473.

258 1d.

Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475.
at 480.
2611d. at 475.
259

260 Id.

262

339 U.S. 763 (1950).
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475-76.
264 Id. at 476.
263
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Petitioners here differ from the Eisentrager detainees in important
respects: They are not nationals of countries at war with the United
States, and they deny that they have engaged in or plotted acts of
aggression against this country; they have never been afforded access
to any tribunal, much less charged with and convicted of wrongdoing;
and for more than two years they have been imprisoned in territory
over which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and
control. 265

This thus meant that habeas review was available to those at
Guantanamo Bay and all those detained there were entitled to challenge
their detention.
C. RUMSFIELD V. PADILLA

Rumsfield v. Padilla was the third of three Supreme Court decisions
ruling an individual being held in detention by the United States and
suspected as a terrorist must receive a hearing?66 Jose Padilla was an
American citizen detained in Chicago by the Bush Administration after
he had returned from Pakistan. He was then transported to New York
and placed in federal custody under a warrant issued by a grand jury
investigating the 9-11 bombings. 267 Padilla obtained a lawyer and sought
to contest his detention. While his motion was pending, the Bush
Administration designated him an enemy combatant and placed him in
military custody in South Carolina. 268 He was so designated because the
government believed that he wished to set off a "dirty bomb" in the
United States in cooperation or on behest of al-Qaeda. The Bush
Administration justified his detention based both on the president's
power as commander in chief and the congressional AUMF of
September 18, 2001. 269 Padilla sought habeas review in federal district
court in New York City, naming as respondents President Bush,
Secretary Rumsfeld, and Navy Commander Melanie A. Marr,
commander of the South Carolina facility. 270 The government sought
dismissal of the petition, claiming both that only Marr was a proper
respondent and that the New York court lacked jurisdiction to hear the
case. 271
265

Id.

2671d.

u.s. at 426 (2004).
at 430-1.

268 1d.

at 430.

2(f} Id.

at 431.
at 433.

266 542

270Id.
271

1d.
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The district court ruleding that the president could detain Padilla
and that the court had jurisdiction to hear the habeas petition.272 The
Court of Appeals reversed, holding both that the Secretary of Defense
was the appropriate respondent for habeas and that the President had no
authority to detain Padilla militarily. 273
The Supreme Court reversed, deciding only the jurisdictional issues
in the case and not whether the president has the authority to detain
Padilla. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist indicated that the
federal habeas law was clear in stating that the appropriate respondent is
"the person who has custody over [the petitioner].,,274 This respondent or
person must be the one who could actually produce the detained
individual before the court. 275 The respondent is also the one who has
direct physical control over the person filing the habeas petition. 276 Since
only Marr had this type of relationship to Padilla, she was the only
proper habeas respondent, and not Bush or Rumsfield. 277
Next, having determined that Marr was the proper respondent,
Rehnquist then indicated that a court may only grant habeas petitions
"within their respective jurisdictions.,,278 Jurisdiction for habeas is also
fixed to the place where one is physically confined.279 Thus, the proper
place for Padilla to bring his petition was in the district court of South
Carolina were he was detained, with Marr as the respondent. 28o As a
result, the Second Circuit opinion was reversed.
After the Supreme Court decision, Padilla refiled for habeas corpus
review in South Carolina and the district court ruled that he was detained
illegally and that he should be criminally charged or released. 281 On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed. 282 Relying upon the Supreme
Court's opinion in Hamdi, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the Congress had
authorized the president to detain Padilla with its September 18, 2001
AUMF. 283 Padilla then sought review of the Fourth Circuit decision,284
and in response, the government charged Padilla, asked the Fourth
Padilla, 542 U.S. at 432·33.
ld. at 433.
274 ld. at 434 (quoting 28 U.S.c. § 2242).
275 l d.

272

273

at 437-38.
at 441-442.
278 Padilla, 542 U.S. at 442 (quoting 28 U.S.c. § 2241 (a».
279 Padilla, 542 U.S. at 442.
280 !d. at 451.
281 Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F.Supp.2d. 678 (D.S.C. 2005).
282 Padilla v Hanft, 423 F. 3d. 386 (4th Cir. 2005).
283 Padilla, 423 F. 3d at 391.
284 Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006) cert. denied.
276 l d.

277 ld.
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Circuit to vacate their decision, and then sought to transfer him from a
military to a civilian facility. The Fourth Circuit refused the request to
transfer and vacate,285 contending that all this was done simply to avoid
Supreme Court review:
We believe that the transfer of Padilla and the withdrawal of our
opinion at the government's request while the Supreme Court is
reviewing this court's decision of September 9 would compound what
is, in the absence of explanation, at least an appearance that the
government may be attempting to avoid consideration of our decision
by the Supreme Court, and also because we believe that this case
presents an issue of such especial national importance as to warrant
final consideration by that court, even if only by denial of further
review, we deny both the motion and suggestion. If the natural
progression of this significant litigation to conclusion is to be
pretermitted at this late date under these circumstances, we believe
that decision should be made not by this court but, rather, by the
Supreme Court of the United States. 286
Subsequently, the Supreme Court reversed, granted the transfer, and
acknowledged that a petition for a review of the Fourth Circuit habeas
decision was still under review. 287 Eventually, the Court refused to grant
certiorari in the matter, leaving Padilla in the hands of a civilian court to
review the charges against him.
D. HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD

Of the four Supreme Court opinions thus far testing presidential
power to conduct the war on terrorism after 9-11, Hamdan v. Rumsjeld288
is the latest and most direct rejection of executive authority to sidestep
constitutional protections for individual liberties. In this case Salim
Ahmed Hamdan was a Yemeni national who was captured by American
armed forces in Afghanistan in November, 2001. 289
He was
subsequently turned over to the military and in June, 2002 was
transferred to Guantanamo Bay for detention. He was held without
charges for two years until the the government finally decided to try him
for conspiracy before a military commission. 290 Hamdan sought habeas

285

286

Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582 (4th Cir. 2005).
ld.

287 Hanft

v. Padilla, 126 S.C!. 978 (2006).
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
289ld. at 2759.
290 ld. at 2759.
288
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review to challenge his detention and also mandamus to question his
proposed trial. 291 His arguments were based on two claims: first, that the
commission set up to try him was illegal and, second, that the procedures
to be used in the trial violated basic rules of military and international
law. 292 A district court had ruled in his favor, it was reversed by the
court of appeals, and upon certiorari to the Supreme Court, Justice
Stevens wrote a plurality opinion in favor of Hamdan.
In arguing in favor of both Hamdan's detention and the trial
procedures, the government offered several arguments. First, the
government contended that a November 13, 2001 presidential order
permitted it to detain and try Hamdan in the manner at issue here.293
This November 13 order allowed the president to detain "any noncitizen
for whom the President determines 'there is reason to believe' that he or
she (1) 'is or was' a member of al Qaeda or (2) has engaged or
participated in terrorist activities aimed at or harmful to the United
States," and to have them tried by a military commission created by the
Secretary of Defense. 294 When Hamdan requested a speedy trial under
the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") he was informed that
none of the provisions in the UCMJ applied to his detention, pursuant to
the November 13 Order. 295 This Order is ultimately supported, for the
government, by the AUMF. 296 The second argument the government
used to attack Hamdan's assertions is based upon to the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 ("DT A,,)297 which it contended removed Court
jurisdiction to hear this case. 298
The Court fIrst addressed the DTA argument. Subsection (e) of
section 1005 of the DT A states that: "Except as provided in section 1005
of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, no court, justice, or judge shall
have jurisdiction to hear or consider - (1) an application for a writ of
habeas corpus fIled by or on behalf of an alien detained by the
Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.,,299 On it face,
subsection (e) appeared to preclude the court from reviewing Hamden's
habeas petition. However, Justice Stevens, in his majority opinion,
291

[d.

at 2759.
293 Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed.Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13,2001).
294 Hamdan, 126 S.Ct at 2760 (citing Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed.Reg. at 57834).
295 Hamdan, 126 S.Ct at 2760.
296 /d. at 2775.
297 Detainee Treatment Act, Pub.L. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680 (2005).
298 Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2763-4.
299 Detainee Treatment Act §§ 1005(e)(I) (internal quotations omitted).
292 /d.
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rejected the use of constitutional claims and instead used statutory
construction tools to dismiss the government's position. 3OO Specifically,
he pointed out that while paragraphs two and three of this section of the
DTA (which are not directly at issue in this case and which address
judicial review of other matters relating to detainees) are governed by the
language which make the act take effect immediately upon passage to
claims already pending,301 there is no language in the act that appears to
make the DT A retroactive to claims such as the one Hamdan brought
under paragraph one (which is at issue in this case).302 The government's
position was that this omission was not significant since the DT A
withdrew all jurisdiction from the court regarding the detainees, and
therefore there is a presumption here that unless the judiciary was given
authority to hear these cases, Congress had taken it away.303 However,
Stevens rejected this in favor of another presumption, the rule against
retroactivity, in certain cases, especially those involving alteration of
jurisdiction. 304 The failure of Congress to expressly state that paragraph
one had retroactive effect while saying so for paragraphs two and three
was seen as suggesting a clear intent by Congress not to make it apply to
cases already in the process, such as Hamden's.305 Thus, the Court
turned back the DT A argument as a way to prevent it from hearing this
case.
Turning to the November 13 Order, the Court noted that military
commissions are not mentioned in the Constitution, but instead are an
artifact of military necessity and exigency.306 Yet Justice Stevens stated
that: "Exigency alone, of course, will not justify the establishment and
use of penal tribunals not contemplated by Article I, § 8 and Article III, §
1 of the Constitution unless some other part of that document authorizes
a response to the felt need. ,,307 The Court first raised and then
sidestepped whether the president's power as commander-in-chief would
provide authorization to create these commissions. 308 Instead it argued
that Congress has authorized the creation of these commissions through
its war-making powers, specifically by enacting the UCMJ. 309 In

126 S.Ct at 2764.
301 1d. (citing Detainee Treatment Act § 1005(h».
302 Hamdan, 126 S.Ct at 2763.
303 /d. at 2764.
3(}1 /d. at 2764-5.
305 /d. at 2765-6.
306 /d. at 2772-3.
307 /d. at 2773.
308 Hamdan, 126 S.Ct at 2774.
309 /d.
300 Hamdan,
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addition, even if the president has independent authority to create these
commissions, the Court declared that, "[H]e may not disregard
limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers,
placed on his powers.,,310 The government's position then is that either
the DTA or the AUMF have expanded the president's authority to create
commissions, thereby providing the support for his November 13
order. 311 The Court found nothing in either that served to expand the
president's authority beyond that already listed in the UCMJ.312
Having rejected presidential claims of authority to create military
tribunals with specified trial procedures, the Court then turned to the
charges the commissions will use to try Hamden and other detainees at
Guantanamo Bay. It noted that all parties in this case agreed that there is
a body of common law that appears to govern procedures governing
military commissions,313 and that includes some allegation that the
person facing trial has breached some law or rule against the conduct of
war. 314 After a lengthy analysis of the events of and after 9-11 and
Hamden's role in them, the Court concluded that the
Government must make a substantial showing that the crime for which
it seeks to try a defendant by military commission is acknowledged to
be an offense against the law of war. That burden is far from satisfied
here. The crime of "conspiracy" has rarely if ever been tried as such
in this country by any law-of-war military commission not exercising
some other form of jurisdiction, and does not appear in either the
Geneva Conventions or the Hague Conventions-the major treaties on
the law of war. 315

The Court rejected examples cited by the government as instances
where conspiracy was tried before these type of tribunals/ 16 and it also
310

[d. at 2774 n.23 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637

311

Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2775.

(1952)).
312 [d.
313!d.
314 Id.
315

at 2777.
at 2780-1.

[d.

316 [d. at 2781-84. Specifically, the Court rejected the government's contention that Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) supported their argument that military commissions may try
conspiracy charges because the defendants in that case were charged with that offense. The Court in
Hamdan responded to this argument by stating that saboteurs were being tried for other offenses in
addition to conspiracy and the Court never ruled on the conspiracy issue. 126 S.Ct.at 2782.
According to Justice Stevens, "If anything, Quirin supports Hamdan's argument that conspiracy is
not a violation of the law of war. Not only did the Court pointedly omit any discussion of the
conspiracy charge, but its analysis of Charge I placed special emphasis on the completion of an
offense; it took seriously the saboteurs' argument that there can be no violation of a law of war-at
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pointed out that there are no treaties or international law that would
permit this either. 317
Finally, Justice Stevens looked at the rules of evidence and trial
procedures to be used to try Hamdan. He noted that hearsay may be
admitted, the defendant could be denied access to examine this evidence,
and that he could be convicted with a two-thirds verdict. 318 All of these
procedural and evidentiary rules are both contrary to what is provided in
the UCMJ 319 and in international covenants such as the Third Geneva
Convention of 1949. 320
As a last point, the Court also rejected contentions by the
government that the Geneva Convention does not apply to Hamdan
because that international agreement applies only to states and not to
individuals who are members of al Qaeda, which is not a government. 321
Essentially this is the claim that the government made in its Detainee
Memorandum. Without directly rejecting this claim, the Court pointed
out that some parts of these conventions, known as Common Article 3,
apply to everyone, including individuals such as Hamdan, who are not
attached to any government. 322 This article, the Court found, precluded
Hamdan from being tried by the special commissions the president has
created in his November 13 Order because "Common Article 3, then, is
applicable here and, as indicated above, requires that Hamdan be tried by
a 'regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which
are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.",323 Having found
that the commissions authorized by the November 13 Order lacked these
minimum guarantees, the Court also refused to recognize the procedures
to be used to try Hamden to be satisfactory.
Overall, the Hamdan opinion is to date the most forceful rejection
of presidential authority to conduct the war on terrorism. While it does
not directly reject inherent presidential powers to act, it suggests clear

least not one triable by military commission-without the actual commission of or attempt to
commit a "hostile and warlike act." Id. In several places in Hamdan Justice Stevens attacked the
Quirin precedent as supporting the government's arguments or uses it again them. See, e.g., 126
S.Ct. at 2773 (citing Quirin as supporting the proposition that "Congress and the President, like the
courts, possess no power not derived from the Constitution"). See also loUIS FISHER,
PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER, 205-8 (2004) (discussing how Quirin is not precedent for Bush's
military tribunals).
317 Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2784.
3I8 ld. at 2786-7.
319 1d. at 2790 n.47.
320 Id. at 2790-1, 2793.
3211d. at 2795.
322 1d.
323

Hamdan, 126 S.C!. at 2796.
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limits to it, both in terms of what AUMF permitted, as well as in terms of
international law. The opinion also suggested that like it or not,
international law is binding on the United States, and contrary to the
assertions made in the four memoranda, the president does not get the
last word in terms in war and foreign policy matters.
E. SUMMARY

As a result of the sagas of Hamdi, Rasul, Padilla, and Hamdaen,
several conclusions can be drawn. First, citizens or non-citizens detained
on American soil are entitled to a habeas hearing to contest their
confinement. Eight Justices in three opinions in Hamdi agreed to this
proposition, while six Justices in two opinions (one including a five
person majority) in Rasul agreed. In Hamdan, five Justices in two
opinions agreed on this point. Only one Justice (Thomas in Hamdi) thus
far has ruled on the merits that the president has inherent authority to
detain individuals, while five Justices (a four person plurality plus
Thomas) in Hamdi have held that the AUMF authorizes detention.
Conversely, four Justices in two opinions in Hamdi reject the theory that
the AUMF permits the detention and five Justices in Hamdan drew clear
limits to what the AUMF authorizes and what the president may do.
Overall, the Court seems to be shying away from the inherent
presidential power claims raised by the Y00 and other three Department
of Justice or White House Counsel memoranda, and is of mixed but
skeptical opinion on the congressional authorization claim.
Yet even with the congressional authorization, only Thomas seems
prepared to reject judicial review of any detention, with the rest of the
Court prepared to argue that the AUMF does not abrogate the
constitutional protections individuals have. For now, the Court seems to
be siding with protection of individual rights, rejecting Bush's claims.
The Court also seems to be unwilling to accept claims that the
presidential has unlimited foreign policy and war powers, that he does
not get the final say in these matters, that international law is binding,
and the Congress and the judiciary still have a role to play after 9-11.
For now, the Constitution and federal law still applies and limits
presidential power. Finally, the Bush Administration has generally not
been successful in other court proceedings related to the war on
terrorism. For example, a former professor Sami al-Arian was tried on
fifty-one counts related to government claims that he and others were
fronting for Palestinian terrorists. A jury acquitted on eight counts and
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deadlocked on the others. 324 In addition, since President Bush declared
the war on terrorism, no principles have been convicted yet. The sole
conviction thus far was Zacarias Moussaoui, the so called "twentieth
hijacker" in 9-11 who pled guilty on April 22, 2005 to terrorist charges
brought against him. However, while acknowledging ties to al Qaeda, he
denied any connection to 9-11, and it does not appear that he was a
principle or major player in any terrorist organization.
In addition, in AI-Marri v. Wright the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that the Military Commissions Act which denied habeas to
enemy combatants did not apply to the detainee in question. 325
Moreover, and more importantly, the Court rejected claims by the
administration that the president had inherent authority to order the
seizure and indefinite detention of a civilian. In reaching the merits of
AI-Marri's detention claim the Court dismissed arguments that AUMF
authorized the detention. 326 More importantly, the Fourth Circuit directly
rejected the claims of inherent presidential powers as commander-inchief to detain a civilian.327 In the Court's words:
To sanction such presidential authority to order the military to seize
and indefinitely detain civilians, even if the President calls them
"enemy combatants," would have disastrous consequences for the
Constitution-and the country. For a court to uphold a claim to such
extraordinary power would do more than render lifeless the
Suspension Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the rights to criminal
process in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments; it would
effectively undermine all of the freedoms guaranteed by the
Constitution. It is that power-were a court to recognize it-that could
lead all our laws "to go unexecuted, and the government itself to go to
pieces." We refuse to recognize a claim to power that would so alter
the constitutional foundations of our Republic. 328

However, while in AI-Marri the Fourth Circuit refused to endorse
the denial of habeas, in both Boumediene v. Bush 329 and Al Odah v.
United States the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld
congressional authority under the Military Commissions Act of 2006 to
deny jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions for Guantanamo Bay
324 Eric Lichtblau. Non Guilt Verdict in Florida Terror Trial are Setbacks for U.S .• N. Y.
TIMES. Dec. 7,2005, at AI.
m 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007).
31h l d. at 177-78, 184.
m ld. at 190-95.
328 l d. at 195.
329 476 F.3d 98 I (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted 127 S.Ct. 3078 (2007).
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prisoners. 33o Here, the Court did not rule on claims of inherent
presidential power or authority under AUMF, but instead ruled that the
Military Commissions Act of 2006 did not violation the Suspensions
Clause in Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the Constitution. In June,
2007, the Supreme Court voted to grant certiorari. in the case.
Additionally, in June, 2007, a military judge dismissed charges against
Hamdan and the only other Guantanamo prisoner facing trial. 33l
Finally, in American Civil Liberties Union v. National Security
Agencl 32 a Michigan district court struck down as unconstitutional the
president's warrantless electronic surveillance program, finding that it
violated both the First and Fourth Amendments. More importantly, this
case rejected the government's claims that the president has inherent
authority to authority this type of surveillance. However, a Sixth Circuit
decision overturned the decision, ruling that the plaintiffs lacked standing
because they had failed to demonstrate an injury.333
Overall, up to this point while lower courts have rejected the unitary
executive theory, the Supreme Court has yet to rule on its merits, opting
instead to find other reasons to limit presidential authority. Whether that
will continue to be the trend after the Court rules in the Boumediene and
Al Odah cases is open for debate, especially light of the ascension of
Justices Roberts and Alito to it.

IV. EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
Assessment of the war on terrorism and democracy does not end at
the American borders. It also encompasses the United Kingdom, Spain,
Germany and the entire European Union. Yet they way each responded
varied significantly from the response in the United States.
A. TONY BLAIR AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

After the terrorist attacks of 9-11, Prime Minister Tony Blair
appeared to be Bush's biggest ally. He supported the war on terrorism
by offering troops to aid the United States in Afghanistan and by urging
the ouster of Saddam Hussein from Iraq. His government voted
consistently in the United Nations for the enforcement of resolutions to

330 Id.
331
332

Jess Bravin, Terror War Legal Edifice Teeters,

WALL

ST. J., June 13,2007, at A4.

438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (D. Mich. 2006).
333 American Civil Liberties Union v. National Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir.

2007).
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destroy weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and he provided significant
military aid to support Bush's war on terrorism.
One reward for his support for these efforts were a series of terrorist
bombings of the London Underground on July 7, 2005 that were linked
to al Qaeda. 334 Perhaps in response to the attack, Blair's government
proposed changing the law, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security
Act,335 that then allowed suspected terrorists to be detained without
charges for 14 days, to 90 days. His bill also would have made it illegal
for some types of "glorification" or incitement or advocacy of terrorist
acts. 336 Contrary to what happened in the United States where Congress
quickly passed the Patriot Act, Blair lost. His own Labor government
refused to support these measures and instead only supported detainment
without charges for 28 daYS.337
In addition, as in the United States, the British courts also responded
to the war on terrorism by rebuking torture and other deprivations of
individual rights. In FC and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department the House of Lords ruled that the common law barred the
use of evidence obtained by torture. 338 The Law Lords saw this rule not
as evidentiary but constitutional, contending that "from the earliest days
the common law of England sets it face firmly against the use of
torture.,,339 While this decision seemed to place some limits on how
suspected terrorists would be treated, in Secretary of State for the Home
Department v. JJ, a British High Court struck down a government tactic
used against terrorists, house arrests without trials. 340 At issue was a
provision of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 which permitted the
house arrest without trial of individuals suspected of being terrorists?41
Justice Jeremy Sullivan who presided over this case, ruled that this
provision of the Act violated Article 5(1) of the European Convention on
Human Rights which provides that "Everyone has the right to liberty and
security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the

334 London rocked by terror attacks, BBC NEWS, July 7, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.ukl
\lhi/ukl4659093.stm.
335 HELEN DUFFY, THE "WAR ON TERROR" AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 356 (2005).
336 BBC News, Q & A: Blair's terror bill defeat, BBC NEWS, Nov. 9, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uklllhi/uk_politicsl4421726.stm.
3371d.

[2005) UKHL 71, [2006) 2 A.C. 221 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K).
at'll II.
340 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. 11, [2006) EWHC 1623 (Admin) (Q.B.).
341 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c. 2 § 3(10) (U.K.).
338

339 1d.
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following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by
law .... ,,342
In A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department the House of
Lords held that the indefinite detention of aliens under section 23 of the
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 - a detention policy
similar to the one George Bush ordered for individuals at Guantanamo
Bay - violated the European Convention on Human Rights and the
Human Rights Act. 343 However, in the case of all of the policies thus
far before the Hight Courthad been presented by the government under
an argument similar to the Unitary Executive theory as in the United
States. In part this is because of the absence of a separation of powers
style government in the United Kingdom. In addition, critical to the
reasoning, at least in the case of A v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, was international law (Convention on Human Rights) in
binding the government. 344 Finally, unlike the United States Supreme
Court which thus far has been willing to directly confront claims of
inherent presidential power, the House of Lords has surprisingly
dismissed any parliamentary supremacy claims, finding instead that
national or international commitments to human rights bar torture or
indefinite detention.
Overall, as in the United States, the British judiciary seems
unwilling in some case to let the specter of terrorism equate to an
unlimited governmental authority at the expense of individual rights.
B. SPAIN

On March 11, 2004, mere days before national parliamentary
elections, terrorists bombed Madrid train stations, killing nearly 200
individuals. 345 Originally the Spanish President Jose Aznar blamed the
attacks on Basque Separatists, but soon it was learned that the attacks
were also linked to al-Qaeda. Aznar supported Bush's war on terrorism,
voting to support the invasion of Iraq at the United Nations and
deploying troops in assistance of that effort. His stance was unpopular in
Spain, and Socialist presidential candidate Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero
pledged to withdraw the troops if elected. 346 It was this opposition to the

342

II at'll II.

343 [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.). See also Human
Rights Act, 1998. c. 42 (U.K.); Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, § 23 (U.K.).
344 II at'll II.
345 Scores die in Madrid bomb carnage, BBC NEWS, Mar. II, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.ukl
2Ihi1europel3500452.stm.
346 Spain threatens Iraq troop pull-out, BBC NEWS, Mar. 15,2004, http://news.bbc.co.ukl
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troop deployment, and the belief that Aznar lied about who was
responsible for the Madrid bombings these factors are largely credited
with Aznar's defeat and the election of a leftist government. 347 As a
result, Zapatero and Spain have made no changes in detention or criminal
laws to respond to the war on terrorism.
C. GERMANY

The only trial thus far that had resulted in the conviction of a
terrorist definitely linked to al Qaeda and perhaps 9-11 events occurred
in Germany. 348 However, the German Federal Court of Justice
overturned that conviction, on fair trial grounds. 349 The basis of the
ruling was that the United States had failed to turn over to the defense
exculpatory evidence. 350
D. EUROPEAN UNION
Finally, two last events affecting the EU nations in general have
arisen as a result of the war on terror that test their commitment to
democracy and America's efficacy to defeat al Qaeda. First, allegations
surfaced in 2005 that the CIA was possibly operating torture camps in
several EU nations, perhaps including Poland or other former Eastern
Bloc nations.35 I Such camps, if they exist, would certainly violate the
ECHR. 352 Second, EU members, concerned about allegations of torture,
and also about the United States' use of the death penalty, increasingly
have become more concerned about extraditing suspected terrorists to
America. 353
The combined result of the stories about torture, the death penalty,

2lhi/europeJ3512144.stm.
347 Aznar scorns Madrid 'bomb lies'. BBC NEWS, Nov. 29. 2004, http://news.bbc.co.ukl
2lhi/europeJ405070 I.stm.
348 HELEN DUFFY. THE "WAR ON TERROR" AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 377 (2005).
349 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH) [Federal Court of Justice) Mar. 3, 2004, Strafberteitiger, StV
4/2004 (F.R.G).
3lO DUFFY, THE "WAR ON TERROR" AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW at
377.
3S1 Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons. WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005.
at AI.
m Craig Whitlock. Europe Wants Allswers 011 CIA Camps, WASH. POST, Nov.4, 2005, at
AI (noting European criticism that the CIA torture camps are illegal and may violate the European
Convention on Human Rights).
m Lisbeth Kirk, Europeall Courts May Challellge US Terror Renditions, EU OBSERVER,
Nov. 14, 2005, http://euobserver.coml9120314??print=l.
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and even the failure on the United States to cooperate on the sharing of
exculpatory evidence may suggest a toughening of a resolve of EU
nations to fight terrorism without sacrificing democracy and individual
rights, while at the same time America's approach may hurt both efforts
to secure international cooperation to defeat terrorism and uphold
democracy.

V.

CONCLUSION

The event of 9111 and subsequent Western responses to terrorism
have challenged basic commitments to democracy, constitutionalism,
and liberalism in Europe and the United States. Across the states in
these areas one such challenge emerged with the decision to collapse law
enforcement into foreign policy and confront terrorism by military and
not criminal law means. This merger of two traditionally distinct policy
areas has come at the sacrifice of individual rights, at least in the United
States, with little to show for it. Several years out, no majors or terrorist
principals have been convicted, and the mythology of presidential power
that Bush has constructed to justify his actions has met with limited
judicial support in the United States. In addition, when compared to the
responses of other EU nations, his actions have led to a reversal of a
conviction in Germany and assertions that the United States is in
violation of international law. In England and Spain, two other victims
of terrorist attacks, they have generally not sacrificed rights to security,
with the House of Lords (sitting as a court) and Parliament rejecting
torture and extended detention policies along the lines advocated by the
Bush Administration.
Bush's war on terrorism has turned out to be a war on democracy,
both in terms of the attack on human rights, and also in assertions of
extra-constitutional executive authority. If we judge the efficacy of this
war by Bush's own words-"The object of terrorism is to try to force us
to change our way of life, is to force us to retreat, is to force us to be
what we're not"-then the terrorists may win unless both Congress and
the courts reject his theory of the unitary executive and the approach to
national security he has articulated. 354

354 See also EMANUEL GROSS, THE STRUGGLE OF DEMOCRACY AGAINST TERRORISM:
LESSONS FROM THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KiNGDOM, AND ISRAEL 258 (2006) (concluding

that: "When the state itself undermines the foundations of its own democratic regime in the name of
its war against terror, what just cause can it assert in pursuance of its fight against those who seek the
very same reSUlt?").
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